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AVIATION TORT LITIGATION AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES - JUDICIAL INROADS ON
THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND CONCEPT
ANDREW J. DILK*
AN INTRODUCTORY LOOK AT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS
IN AVIATION TORT law, the pilot-in-command con-
cept places primary responsibility for the successful op-
eration of the aircraft on the pilot in charge of the flight.'
Authorized by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) implemented the pi-
lot-in-command concept and promulgated the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs) which assign the pilots' reg-
ulatory duties. 2 A concept historically at the backbone of
the pilot/air traffic control navigation system, the pilot-in-
command concept has suffered dilution as a result of fed-
eral judicial decisions holding air traffic controllers par-
tially liable in aviation accidents. The federal judiciary's
rejection of the pilot-in-command concept ignores the
completely different nature of the corresponding duties of
the pilot-in-command3 and the air traffic controller. The
* Manager, Accident Counsel Branch, Litigation Division, Office of the Chief
Counsel, FAA. B.A. and J.D. Georgetown University.
'14 C.F.R. §§ 1-139.127 (1986). 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1986) describes the "pilot-
in-command" as "the pilot responsible for the operation and safety of an aircraft
during flight time."
2 The Federal Aviation Act is located at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
3 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1986) makes the pilot-in-command "directly responsible
for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft."
4 Perhaps in some small part the use of the term "controller" rather than "advi-
sor" has created the erroneous impression in the minds of some judges that a
"controller" can somehow suggest how to operate the aircraft's controls to a dis-
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courts' continuing failure to appreciate the different du-
ties of the pilot and the air traffic controller illustrates that
the courts either fail to comprehend, or arbitrarily reject,
the system because it conflicts with the judiciary's emo-
tional temperament.
The relationship between a pilot and a controller can be
analogized in some ways to the relationship between an
automobile driver and a policeman. One might think of a
policeman directing the driver of an automobile on a de-
tour caused by a fallen tree. The policeman can point the
driver in a particular direction but cannot control him in
manipulating the bends in the road. The policeman as-
sumes that the driver has received the proper training,
testing, and licensing to drive the automobile, has suffi-
cient fuel and functional brakes, and will not collide with
another automobile or the tree. By the same token, air
traffic controllers provide "clearances" to a pilot. Clear-
ances represent to the pilot that no other aircraft will re-
ceive a clearance to do the same thing at the same time
and play a particularly important role in instrument
weather conditions when pilots cannot see and avoid each
other.5 The controller's separation of one aircraft from
other aircraft constitutes the nub of the air traffic control
system. However, the controller cannot direct the pilot in
actually manipulating his flight path.
The FAA establishes air traffic control (ATC) facilities
at certain locations, exercises discretion in designing the
facilities, determines the number of controllers at each fa-
cility and their functions, and decides what type of serv-
ices to provide at each facility. These decisions, combined
with the fact that the controllers assume the pilots will do
what the regulatory system requires, indicate the reliance
placed by the controllers on the pilot-in-command (PIC)
concept. The rising-number ofjudicial decisions rejecting
the PIC concept historically relied upon by both pilots
oriented, disorganized or incompetent pilot. For the purposes of this article, all
air traffic controllers referred to are employees of the FAA.
5 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.115-91.129 (1986) for the Instrument Flight Rules.
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and controllers not only assumes a defect in the agency
implementation of the pilot/controller system, but also
constitutes a presumption ofjudicial omniscience that re-
mains largely unsupported.
In its evaluation of aviation accident cases, the United
States judiciary often creates a standard of care that trans-
gresses any duty assigned to pilots or assumed by the
ATC system. Jurists too often adopt findings of fact care-
fully crafted by the plaintiff's counsel in these cases. Un-
fortunately, these facts frequently contradict the PIG
concept, which delegates primary responsibility to pilots
and secondary responsibility to controllers. Privately
funded aviation experts6 often persuade the courts to re-
ject the presumption that the air traffic controllers acted
consistently with their training. The courts' analysis in
such cases apparently rejects either common sense, the
presumption that air traffic controllers fulfilled their du-
ties, or allegiance to the fair play of the United States judi-
cial system.
This commentary does not deal with the constitutional
separation of powers between the executive and judicial
branches. Nor is it just a matter of sour grapes. It simply
searches for the objectivity in aviation accident cases upon
which the judicial system and the Federal Tort Claims Act
are theoretically based. The commentary criticizes the at-
titude of a growing number of judges who, through their
findings of fact and conclusions of law, distort the reality
of the largely well-tuned aviation administrative system
known, understood, and generally adhered to by the pi-
lots and controllers using it. The legal inroads into the
pilot-in-command concept result from some personal,
moral, or social belief of thejurists not recognized by stat-
utes, regulations, manuals, or traditional case law. A
a The qualifications of an air traffic controller presented as an expert in court
are questionable if he has not functioned as a controller for years, has not worked
at the type of ATC facility involved in the accident, or has not utilized the type of
equipment involved. Furthermore, such experts offer their opinion as to the pi-
lot's decicion-making process although they may have never been a pilot.
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number of federal district courts too readily adopt a pa-
ternalistic approach to the allocation of liability in aviation
accident cases. These courts refuse to accept the fortui-
tous and isolated nature of tragedies such as aircraft acci-
dents. As a result, they rely on a public liability approach
and arbitrarily assign fault to air traffic control in an effort
to provide government compensation to the injured for
their losses in aviation accidents.
I. THE REGULATORY PILOT-IN-COMMAND CONCEPT (PIC)
The regulatory pilot-in-command concept originated in
the military and served as the foundation for responsibil-
ity assumed by military pilots. The PIC concept recog-
nizes that only the pilot in command of the aircraft in
flight knows his limitations and his responsibilities. Such
responsibilities include a preflight inspection of the air-
craft, preflight planning, evaluation of the weather, and
maintenance of flight currency requirements.7 The air
traffic control system expects and assumes that the pilot-
in-command has competently fulfilled his responsibilities
before and during the flight. Futhermore, the ATC sys-
tem of the FAA relies on the assumption that pilots will do
precisely what the Federal Aviation Regulations require,
and, because of their testing and training, that the pilots
will not need a timely reminder as to what the FARk re-
quire.8 If controllers could not rely on such assumptions,
aviation would generally come to a halt.
The FARs require pilots to be capable of conducting
flights, making approaches, and executing missed ap-
proaches to an airport runway without an air traffic con-
troller. The thousands of daily flights, both commercial
7 E.g., Michelmore v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
a~fdsub nom., Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972) (the district
court observed that "(the pilot] alone knows the capability of his aircraft, and he
and he alone knows his own qualification to operate the aircraft").
"E.g., Colorado Flying Academy v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 878 (10th Cir.
1984) (citing with approval the district court's conclusion that "an air traffic con-
troller has the right to rely upon the assumption that a pilot knows and will abide
by the applicable Federal Aviation Regulations").
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and general, made to airports throughout the United
States where no air traffic control service exists illustrates
PIG primary responsibility, ATC assumption of pilot ca-
pability, and the independent nature of the duties of pi-
lots and controllers. How does the pilot land at an airport
when flying virtually "in the blind," without any control-
ler within 100 miles? The pilot guides himself only with
FARs, approach plates depicting the regulatory landing
procedure,9 and an airport instrument landing system
used during the approach and landing. As required by
the FARs, the pilot flies on the aircraft's instruments with-
out relying on continuous sequencing or advisories from
ATC.
A. Historical Development of the PIC Concept
Since 1941 when pilots utilizing United States airspace
first received federal certification,10 the advances in tech-
nology have not altered the duty of pilots to comply with
FARs or the expectations of controllers that pilots will so
comply. While modem technology has made the ATC
system more efficient; it has not altered the regulatory pi-
lot-in-command concept" that the pilot has primary re-
sponsibility for control and operation of the aircraft.' 2
' The FARs require pilots flying under instrument conditions to carry approach
plates depicting the instrument approach procedures for landing at the intended
airport. 14 C.F.R. § 91.116(a) (1986). For Standard Instrument Approach proce-
dures, see 14 C.F.R. § 97 (1986).
to A. BRIDDON, E. CtAMPIE & P. MARRAINE, FAA HISTORCMAL FACT BOOK 43
(1974) [hereinafter cited as A. BRIDDON].
11 The "pilot-in-command" is defined in 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 and 91.3(a) (1986).
In those aircraft certificated for flight only with more than one pilot, 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.213 (1986), the military "chain-of-command" requirements apply, 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.55 (1986). Historically, ATC was included in this regulatory chain-of-com-
mand only for those functions which controllers are trained to expect pilots to
rely on.
12 Like the legion of circuit court cases citing 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1986) for the
proposition that the pilot-in-command is primarily responsible for control of his
aircraft, other circuit court decisions have acknowledged the secondary duties of
controllers. See Hamilton v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 426, 432 (N.D. Cal.
1971), aJ'd, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974) (the court observed that "the duties of
the controllers, when they exist at all, are purely secondary"). The respective du-
ties of the PIC and ATC have been described as "concurrent but independent
1987] 801
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Technological advances including developments in
solid-state and microchip electronics have created signifi-
cant changes in the active (primary) operational control of
an aircraft by the pilot and the passive (ancillary) assist-
ance functions of the controller.18 While the pilot's bur-
den has lessened with the development of more
sophisticated aircraft instrumentation, the regulatory sys-
tem addressing the responsibilities of the PIG has re-
mained very much constant. Modem instrumentation
should not shift the pilot's burden to fly safely to ATC,
nor should it force ATC to speculate on a pilot's ability to
use his instrumentation.
ATC has similarly experienced vast improvements in ra-
duties." Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1982) (Becker, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983). Decisions that depend on condi-
tions known in detail only by the pilot must be made by him. I at 183. Similarly,
the function of controllers has been held to be that of merely assisting the pilot in
the performance of duties imposed on him. United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703,
710-11 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
is A limited chronology of advances affecting operational control of an aircraft
in IFR weather conditions (when the pilot cannot see outside the cockpit for visual
reference in order to maintain the stability of the aircraft and is physically incapa-
ble of providing his own visual separation from other aircraft) includes:
1929 James H. Doolittle made the first recorded successful instrument landing.
Receiving directional guidance from a radio range course aligned with the runway
and distance from the airport by means of radio markers, he controlled his alti-
tude with a sensing altimeter. A directional gyro and artificial horizon provided
altitude guidance. A. BRIDDON, supra note 10, at 17.
1931 The first instrument landing by a sytem incorporating a glide slope was
made at the College Park, Maryland Airport. Id at 20.
1932 The first blind solo flight on instruments only occurred at Dayton, Ohio. I.
at 20.
1933 The first cross-country test of all-instrument (blind) flying and landing was
made from College Park, Md. to Newark, N.J. Id. at 21.
1937 The first wholly automatic aircraft landing was made at Dayton, Ohio. I. at
32.
1947 The CAA granted its first approval of the Army GCA radar device for com-
mercial planes, authorizing its use by Pan American Airways at Gander, New-
foundland. I& at 55.
1951 The CAA put into operation the the first VOR (very high frequency, omni-
directional range) airway for use by pilots. Id. at 67.
1952 45,000 miles of very high frequency (omnirange) airways, referred to as
Victor airways, were placed into operation to supplement the then existing 70,000
miles of federally maintained low frequency airways. Id. at 70.
1964 The first computer landing (automatic touchdown) was made by a United
Airlines Carabellejet at Dulles Airport. Id& at 147.
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dar computer technology, weather information, and over-
all modernization of equipment and facilities. 4
Computer technology is currently being used to develop
the Fourth Generation ATC system, described in the Na-
tional Airspace System Plan, which includes an airborne
Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System (TACS). Solid-
state electronics as well as new computer hardware and
software will accommodate more sophisticated levels of
automation and will facilitate the ultimate melding of en
route and terminal functions.
The paralleled leap in electronic wizardry available to
both pilots and controllers has not, despite the testimony
of air traffic experts, changed the limited advisory role of
air traffic controllers who naturally assume that the PIC is
qualified and competent. The regulatory system adminis-
tered by the FAA, upon which pilots and controllers rely
at all times, presumes that the pilot has full control of the
aircraft, fully understands minimum criteria relating to
14 Some technological advances of significance to ATC in providing assistance
to the PIC include:
1941 The CAA began operation of ATC towers, taking them over from local
agencies having airport control. Late in 1941 there were eight towers operated by
the CAA. I& at 43.
1946 The first radar-equipped control tower for civilian flying was unveiled at the
Indianapolis Airport. Id at 52.
1948 Development of the transistor made possible the subsequent production of
the semi-automated Third Generation ATC system. Id at 62.
1959 The FAA put into operation in the New York area a sixty-four code radar
beacon system designed to reinforce primary radar signals from the body of the
aircraft itself and to permit positive identification of individual aircraft equipped
with a transponder emitting electronic signals to reciprocating FAA ground radar
equipment. Id at 92.
1965 The first single radar system capable of displaying Mode C (altitude report-
ing) radar beacon signals in alphanumeric form (called Advanced Radar Terminal
Control System [ARTS]) was installed at the Atlanta terminal. Id at 146. By Au-
gust 1975 sixty-three terminals had acquired the basic ARTS system.
1970 The FAA implemented the Terminal Control Area (TCA) concept which
required an aircraft entering that defined airspace around certain airports to be
equipped with a two-way radio, transponder and VOR navigational receiver. Id at
217.
1974 The Third Generation ATC system was completed at a cost of $640 million.
1975 Radar data processing was completed at all twenty contiguous centers in the
United States.
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aircraft performance, and knows his or her speed, alti-
tude, and approximate location at all times.
Too many courts have reversed the roles of the pilots
and controllers, placing primary responsibility for avia-
tion accidents on the controllers. Neither the regulatory
system nor the personal training and testing of pilots or
controllers can support this fundamental role reversal. In
accident cases involving aircraft flying under instrument
flight rules (IFR), the courts often ignore the aircraft's re-
quired instrumentation' 5 and the controller's reasonable
expectation that the pilot guides himself while flying in
the "blind" with appropriate charts, approach plates, air-
port directory, etc. Courts forget that the pilot has been
trained and tested to fly in instrument conditions, and
that he possesses a minimum number of hours of flight
experience in adverse weather.16 Furthermore, the pilot
does not initiate the flight with the expectation that a con-
troller will have to tell him the location, speed, altitude,
rate of descent, etc., of the aircraft. While pilots do not
expect such instruction, some courts assume that they do.
As a result, these courts too often impose liability on con-
trollers in aviation accident cases, particularly when the
accident involved passengers. Allocating fault to control-
lers places greater responsibility on them than the regula-
tory administrative system and their training intended.
The remainder of this article discusses the interrela-
tionship of the independent duties of the PIC and the
controllers, both at a terminal (Tower) facility and an en-
route (Center) facility, and the judicial rejection of the
FAA's regulatory system relating to PIC responsibilities
and controller assistance.
14 C.F.R. § 91.33(d) (1986).
An applicant for an instrument rating is required to have a total of 125 hours
of flight time, including fifty hours as PIC with other than a student pilot certifi-
cate, forty hours of simulated or actual instrument time, and fifteen hours of in-
strument flight instruction. 14 C.F.R. § 61.65(e) (1986).
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II. THE CLASSICAL JUDICIAL CONCEPT OF A PIC AND
SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL RECIDMSM
Early federal court decisions readily acknowledged the
regulatory premise around which the air traffic control
system of the United States turns. That regulatory prem-
ise places the direct responsibility and the final authority
for the operation of the aircraft in the hands of the PIC.17
Unfortunately, the courts have increasingly diluted the
purity of those earlier decisions that emphasized the PIC
regulatory premise. Judges apply their own moral and so-
cial judgments concerning the allocation of liability in avi-
ation accident cases by using "factual exceptions" which
take responsibility for the operation of the aircraft away
from the PIC and place it on the controller. These factual
exceptions contradict those earlier decisions without ex-
planation and without any modification of the ATC sys-
tem by the FAA to justify the exceptions. Clemente v.
United States, 18 an aviation accident case from the 1970s,
"I See generally Cates v. United States, 544 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding
pilot responsible because controller's statement could not have given a reason-
able pilot clearance to land); Bibler v. Young, 492 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir.) (pilot's
failure to contact local control prevented local control from warning pilot), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.
1974) (ATC under no duty to inform each of two aircraft of others position in
VFR conditions); American Airlines v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969)
(operation of aircraft is sole responsibility of pilot and controller is not to inter-
fere except as specifically required by FAA Air Traffic Control Manuals); Neff v.
United States, 420 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (clearance for takeoff as thunder-
storm approached did not warrant pilot's disregard of apparent signs of danger),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1066 (1970); Somlo v. United States, 416 F.2d 640 (7th Cir.
1969) (failure of controller to give pilot warning of local icing was not the proxi-
mate cause of the crash since the pilot was negligent in bringing the aircraft into
an area of known probable icing), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); United Airlines
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.) (operating personnel of aircraft had the re-
sponsibility for separation of aircraft flying in normal flight rule weather), cert
denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962)
(existence of a control tower at an airfield does not relieve pilot of his duties), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 387 (W.D. Wash.
1975) (operational control of aircraft under visual flight rules is placed on PIC
rather than ATC); Sawyer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (fact
that pilot is flying with air traffic clearance does not relieve him of responsibility
for operational control), af'd, 436 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1971).
' 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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contains judicial language that avoids placing a moral and
legal duty for loss on the government:
We should point out that there is a fine line but a vital and
necessary one between the principle of holding the gov-
ernment responsible for the conduct by which it carries
out its affairs when federal employees negligently injure
the public and the principle that the government may be
turned to as a final source of relief from the tragedies of
life.19
The compensatory concept in aviation tort law has ex-
panded to rely more and more on the government to
compensate those injured in plane crashes. Possible con-
tributing factors to this expansion include the growth of
government social spending in the 1960s, coupled with a
generation of more socially-acclimated judges appointed
to the federal bench. Unfortunately, the expanded com-
pensatory concept frequently veers away from the tradi-
tional emphasis on the independent responsibilities of the
pilot and the controller, and disregards the separate and
distinct functions of controllers as they process the flight
data created by pilots.
Another factor adding to the load placed on controllers
by our litigious society has been the death of the state
contributory negligence defense as a bar to liability.20
The rise of the comparative negligence theory has created
ajudicial attitude regarding liability which cannot bejusti-
fied by the traditional moral and legal concept of duty.
Thus, comparative negligence fosters a judicial attitude
that the court should look to the government to compen-
,, Il at 1150.
20 When the FTCA became effective in 1946 only four states adhered to com-
parative negligence. By the late 1960's, seven additional states had abandoned
contributory negligence through judicial fiat or legislation. By 1980, following
the groundswell of social changes of the 1970s, ten states had established a system
of pure comparative negligence, twenty-three states had established a modified
system, and two states had established a slight-gross system. Today only Ala-
bama, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland and New Mexico adhere to contributory neg-
ligence. Wade, Comparative Negligence - Its Development in the United States and Its
Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REv. 299, 302-06 (1980). See also Alvis v. Ribar,
421 N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Ill. 1981).
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sate the innocent passengers, on an underinsured private
aircraft for injuries when the aircraft crashes, regardless
of actual negligence or proximate cause. In eager pursuit
of a "final source of relief from the tragedies of life,"
these courts have unjustifiably attributed liability to the
air traffic controller, even though the controller per-
formed fully in keeping with training, custom and prac-
tice, the pilot's expectations, and the FAA's regulatory
and administrative procedures.
The growing legislative interest in placing ceilings on
awards, capping noneconomic damages, and revising the
joint and several liability concept reflects a moral with-
drawal from joint and several liability in comparative neg-
ligence law. Ironically, California, the state with the most
aviation activity and whose courts have increasingly ig-
nored traditional aviation responsibilities, leads the
change. Its voters recently adopted Proposition 51 which
rejected the joint and several liability concept and limited
contribution to an amount not greater than a defendant's
pro rata share of negligence.
A. An early dilution of the PIC concept: Ingham v. Eastern
Airlines
Ingham v. Eastern Airlines21 remains one of the first signif-
icant federal appellate court inroads into the respective
duties of pilots and controllers. In Ingham an Eastern DC-
7B aircraft flew from Charlotte, North Carolina to New
York's Kennedy Airport (then Idlewild)Y2 The crew knew
adverse weather conditions could divert the plane to Phil-
adelphia.23 While in a holding pattern, the controller ad-
vised the crew that "there was pretty bad fog on the
airport," and as a result "some [planes] are making it and
some are not."' 24 Traffic control advised the crew at 9:24
p.m. that the visibility at the airport was one and one half
21 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
rd at 229-30.
2s Id at 230.
24 Id. at 231.
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miles with fog and at 9:30 p.m. that visibility had dropped
to one mile.25 At 9:32:29 the controller coordinating in
the radar room announced in a "louder than normal
voice" that the tower had reported a drop in the visibility
to three-quarters of a mile.26 More than a minute later, at
9:33:57, the controller handling the Eastern flight advised
the crew that the visibility remained one mile.27 That "er-
roneous report" was the last visibility reading given to the
crew before the DC-7B crashed twelve minutes later at ap-
proximately 9:45.28
The government argued that the controller's manual
required the controller to advise the pilot of a change in
visibility only when the visibility fell below the crew's min-
imum landing requirements, in this case one-half mile vis-
ibility.29  Providing its own "more meaningful and
reasonable interpretation" of the manual provision,"0 the
court ruled that it
required the approach controller to report those subse-
quent changes which, under all the circumstances, the
crew would have considered important both in determin-
ing whether to attempt a landing, and in preparing for the
weather conditions most likely to be encountered near the
runway. In our view, a drop in visibility of twenty-five per-
cent, from one mile to three-quarters of a mile, bringing
25 rd at 233-34. The visibility readings provided to the crew were taken from
the tower cab and remained at all times above the FAR minimums for landing. A
visibility reading was made by a Runway Visual Range (RVR) device located near
the threshold of Runway 4 Right upon which the Eastern flight was cleared for
landing. Id. at 234. Though the court agreed that the RVR was inoperative, its
below-minimum readings, combined with the surface observations of one-quarter
mile visibility made by a U.S. Weather Bureau observer, had an impact on the
court's evaluation of the FAA visibility reporting procedure. Id. at 234.




so Id at 235. The court rejected the "government's inordinately narrow inter-
pretation" of § 265.2 of the Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual which re-
quired reporting of "current weather conditions, as necessary." Id In recent years,
air traffic experts have distorted the guideline material in the manual, particularly
in testifying that any manual language must be complied with in excruciating
detail.
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existing weather conditions dangerously close to landing
minimums, is such a critical change that, in the interests of
safety, it should have been reported to the crew of EAL512. 1
The writer necessarily rejects the court's misinterpreta-
tion of the manual requirement because the court's rea-
soning assumed that the flight crashed because of the
twenty-five percent difference in visibility. The court
based this assumption only on the speculation that either
the "pilot might have decided to divert to Philadelphia
rather than to attempt an ILS landing at Idlewild," or
"the crew might have maneuvered the plane differently,
and could have been ready and able at an earlier time to
execute a missed approach. 8-2 The court ignored not
only the regulatory pilot-in-command presumption, but
also the fact that the crew understood both that the
weather customarily changed, and that some planes were
landing successfully and some were not. Simply put,
"when the crew finally decided to terminate the improper
approach, the 'missed approach' maneuver was per-
formed in a negligent manner. 33
The decision to execute a missed approach, like the "fi-
nal decision either to attempt a landing or divert to an-
other airport," was justifiably "in the hands of the
pilot."'3 4 The rationale for placing full responsibility on
the pilot, recited but carefully ignored by the court, pro-
vided that "he is in the best position to observe and judge
the actual effect of the weather on the plane's landing ap-
proach." 5 Despite such recitals, the court in essence re-
jected the PIG concept and searched for guarantees of
protection and compensation that the aviation system can
never provide. The court expressed paternalistic concern
for cases like that in Ingham saying, "The pilot should
1 IL
32 l at 236.
33 id at 231.
- Id at 237.
3s Id The pilot's ability to assess his own capabilities and that of the crew is
also significant.
8091987]
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have been told that weather conditions were becoming
marginal, and that he might well encounter less than mini-
mum visibility upon reaching the runway."'3 8 Thus, the
court ignored the crew's awareness of the adverse weather
conditions, the fact that some aircraft had to execute
missed approaches, and the drop in visibility from one
and one-half miles to one mile.
While the controller could have advised the crew of the
drop in visibility, the controller justifiably relied on the
pilot's training, testing, and certification in adverse condi-
tions. If pilots could not fly in such conditions without
guidance, how could any pilot land at an airport without a
tower during IFR weather conditions? The Ingham case
illustrates an early effort to switch the roles of the PIC and
air traffic control. Such role reversal has no foundation in
the development of aviation, in the training of aviators or
controllers, or in the regulatory scheme by which air traf-
fic control provides services to the aviation public. The
Ingham decision cannot be explained by any change in the
regulatory standards relating to the operation of an air-
craft, by any agency assumption of increased agency du-
ties, or by the evolution of some custom and practice
within the pilot/controller system.
Although courts have the power to determine the liabil-
ity of any party, including an employee of the United
States, 7 based on the breach of duty by that party, the
controllers in Ingham breached no duty known to pilots or
controllers. Neither the aviation regulatory system nor
the administrative procedures implementing it reflect
such a duty. Therefore, Ingham established a relatively
new judicially-created duty for air traffic controllers. This
duty, a separate and higher duty than those previously
known to aviation, solely benefited the injured passengers,
because it allowed the courts to reach the government for
compensation.
Cases subsequent to Ingham have, over the years, carved
30 Id.
37 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
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PILOT-IN-COMMAND CONCEPT
out additional niches of responsibility for controllers.
The courts continue to place new duties on the control-
lers, while at the same time reiterating the traditional case
law relating to the PIC responsibilities. This is particu-
larly apparent in lawsuits involving accidents. in IFR
weather conditions. Courts have a natural tendancy to ex-
pect more of controllers during flights in IFR conditions,
and do not appreciate that such flights are normal every-
day experiences for both the controller and the pilot con-
ducting the flight. Judges seem to have difficulty
understanding the concept of flying without visibility and
ignore the fact that the pilot has represented to the ATC
system that he is fully qualified and equipped to deal with
any change in visibility, engine loss, etc. The controller
relies on that representation to mean that the pilot is pre-
pared to deal with an emergency situation.
The writer does not propose that a controller should
ignore a pilot's request for specific assistance in a situa-
tion which the pilot did not have the equipment to handle
or could not be expected to perform. But the courts
should continue to recognize the historical basis for the
PIC concept. The arbitrary assignment of responsibility
for aviation accidents to controllers by some federal
courts indirectly emasculates the PIC concept and serves
to unfairly shift the burden of operation to ATC contrary
to the statutory and regulatory scheme of the FAA. The
courts should also attempt to better understand the pas-
sive nature of the controller's training as well as the con-
troller's assumption that the pilot knows his abilities,
equipment and regulatory responsibilities under the
FARs. The FAA bases its determinations as to the
number of controllers and the existence or type of radar
at each facility on the assumption that all pilots will do
what the FARs require.38
The Federal Aviation Regulations permit the PIC to de-
FAR requirements are described in a wealth of publications utilized in pilot
training such as the Pilots Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA Advisory
Circular AC-61-23B), the Airman's Information Manual (FAA publication issued
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viate from the FARs only in conditions that constitute an
emergency. 9 Courts need to understand that a controller
cannot appreciate the immediacy or severity of conditions
that may develop into a real emergency unless the pilot
frankly admits to the controller that he personally cannot
perform a maneuver or that his aircraft cannot perform
certain maneuvers.4 0 Until then, a controller cannot know
whether a problem exists or the depth of the problem.
More importantly, a nonpilot controller can never appreci-
ate the dozens of factors the pilot must evaluate in a de-
veloping emergency. In aviation accident litigation,
plaintiffs' ATC experts often distort this lack of apprecia-
tion.4 Such experts testify that the controller in radio
contact with the pilot could fully comprehend the serious-
ness of the flight conditions and the amount of informa-
tion available to the pilot. In many real emergencies, the
pilot may already have his hands so full just maintaining
control of the aircraft and weighing his abilities and avail-
able alternatives, that he could not afford the luxury of a
dialogue with the controller. Because of the testimony of
ATC experts, courts have been too willing to find that an
"emergency" existed in which the controller failed to per-
form properly.4 2 Such findings require unreasonable con-
four times annually), the Instrument Flying Handbook (FAA Advisory Circular
AC-61-27c) and Aviation Weather (FAA Advisory Circular 006A).
-9 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b) (1986). "Emergencies" include situations in which the
only pilot has slumped over the steering yoke or the cockpit is on fire. "Potential"
emergencies range from a request for information as to fuel availability at a re-
mote airport to a request for general weather information.
40 Hindsight often shows that a pilot disguised the truth either out of a false
sense of pride or out of fear of an FAA enforcement action against his pilot certifi-
cate because of his noncompliance with the FARs.
41 Usually, ATC experts have no flight experience and know little or nothing
about engine manifold pressure, maximum rate of climb capabilities of the air-
craft, glide characteristics of the aircraft, hours or minutes of flight time in ex-
isting wind conditions, etc.
42 An "emergency" is described in the ATC manual 7110.65, 1550, in the fol-
lowing language:
'Emergency Determinations'
a. An emergency can be either a Distress or Urgency condition, as
defined in the Pilot/Controller Glossary.
b. A pilot who encounters a Distress condition should declare an
emergency by beginning the initial communication with the word
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troller foresight and effort not expected by the pilots,
controllers, or the ATC system.
Since pilot "emergencies" occur in a limitless number
of situations, the FAA can provide controllers with only
the most general guidelines for handling such emergen-
cies in the ATC manual (7110.65). During training, con-
trollers do not participate in specific simulated
emergencies designed to test the controller on his reac-
tion to an actual emergency situation. 43  The ATC man-
ual simply advises the controller to use his or her best
"judgment." 44
'Mayday,' preferably repeated three times. For an Urgency condition,
the word 'Pan' should be used in the same manner.
c. If the words 'Mayday' or 'Pan' are not used and you are in doubt
that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency,
handle it as though it were an emergency.
d. Because of the infinite variety of possible emergency situations,
specific procedures cannot be prescribed. However, when you be-
lieve an emergency exists or is imminent, select and pursue a course
of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circum-
stances and which nearly conforms to the instructions in this
manual.
43 For example, the 1982 FAA Advisory "National Air Traffic Training Pro-
gram" TERMINAL lesson plan dealing with "Emergency, Radio & Radar Failure,
Hijack Procedures" outlines only four emergency situations: 1) Hijacked aircraft,
2) Lost aircraft and VFR aircraft about to encounter IFR conditions, 3) Radio
failure, and 4) Radar failure. Number 2 presents the most trouble since VFR pi-
lots typically enter IFR conditions before they indicate to a controller that they
might need help. The FAA lesson plan distinguishes between actual or imminent
emergency situations, and indicates "minimum requirements" which "would vary
depending on type of emgency" (emphasis added). Depending on the type of emer-
gency, the minimum reporting requirements might include: A) Aircraft identifica-
tion and type, B) Nature of emergency, C) Pilot's desires, D) Aircraft altitude, and
E) Fuel remaining in time. The lesson plan advises coordination with other FAA
facilities "if radar or DF (Director Finder - used when aircraft is lost and radar
service or coverage is unavailable) is available." The plan provides a very bief
outline for controller assistance in "lost aircraft orientation," "radar assistance to
VFR aircraft in weather difficulty," and "informing pilot of minimum safe alti-
tude" and "accurate position determined" if the aircraft has already encountered
IFR conditions. The training of controllers does not even attempt to meet the
extreme expectations of plaintiffs' ATC experts.
40 The FAA Academy lesson plan referred to above states that "All possible
situations or conditions are not covered in the ATC Handbook. Controllers must
use their judgment and experience whenever a situation develops that has no pre-
scribed solution." The plaintiffs' ATC expert often relies on this provision to es-
tablish fault on the part of the controller.
814 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
Unfortunately, the FAA has created somewhat of a di-
lemma by promoting the highest degree of aviation safety
by ATC. The FAA has created differing levels of emer-
gencies. The ATC manual provides that a controller
should treat every potential emergency, however remote,
as an actual emergency. Arguably, every time an aircraft
takes off a potential emergency exists. The FAA also
trains a controller to expect each pilot to promptly advise
ATC when he confronts an emergency. A controller can
fairly assume that a pilot not qualified to fly in instrument
meteorological conditions can decide for himself whether
the cloud cover prohibits visual flight.45 Furthermore, a
controller can assume that if a pilot confronts a change in
meteorological conditions, he will return to his point of
origination. However, the plaintiffs' ATC experts will tes-
tify that a controller could have prevented an accident
that occured when a pilot encountered instrument mete-
orological conditions. Fortunately, the fact that a control-
ler's training does not include the limitless number of
potential or real emerigencies supports the argument that
a controller should not be found at fault in an aviation
emergency situation.
Pilots cannot expect specific controller assistance dur-
ing emergencies until ATC trains controllers to deal with
particular potential or real emergency situations. For ex-
ample, since the controller's primary function is to sepa-
rate aircraft in IFR weather conditions, the pilot can
expect the controller to provide clearances which will al-
low the pilot to avoid other aircraft that the pilot cannot
see in actual IFR conditions. Absent some emergency cre-
ated by the pilot, the ATC has an absolute duty to sepa-
rate aircraft48 on IFR flight plans.47 Furthermore, when a
controller provides a pilot with clearance on an IFR flight
4' See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.105-91.109 (1986) for the Visual Flight Rules.
40 Such separation may not be "standard" separation by reason of emergency
or other limited circumstances.
47 The pilot of an aircraft on an IFR flight plan still has a duty in visual flight
conditions to observe other aircraft, particularly those which have not, either in
compliance or not in compliance with the FARs, filed a flight plan for such flight.
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plan for the entire distance between points A and B at a
certain altitude, the pilot can expect and presume that no
mountain peak juts above that altitude on that flight path.
The expectations and presumptions between pilots and
controllers are mutual, however. Therefore, when the pi-
lot is cleared at a given altitude between points A and B,
with a clearance to land at C, the aviation system
presumes that the pilot is qualified to precisely conduct
such a flight and approach for landing. It also assumes
that he has the proper equipment, sufficient fuel, and the
appropriate aeronautical chart and approach plate for the
specific runway, and that he maintains a keen awareness of
his location at all times by referring to the aircraft instru-
ments and the appropriate chart/approach plate. Unless
a pilot conducting an IFR flight has reported the loss of
some critical piece of equipment for which no back-up
equipment exists, the controller assumes that the PIG is
complying with regulatory requirements and good operat-
ing practices and that he can satisfactorily complete the
flight.
The burden of presumption would shift from the pilot
to the controller only in those situations in which the pilot
did not know critical facts. Those unknown critical facts
must result from some development or phenomena not
within the pilot'i control, and not simply from the pilot's fail-
ure to do what the ATC system expected of him. Those
facts must be so patent and so obvious to the nonpilot
controller that one could only conclude that the situation
required a controller advisory to the pilot. An example of
a critical fact unknown to the pilot, an "unexpected un-
known," would include a new report of severe weather
made by other pilots (PIREP's) to the controller that
could adversely affect the pilot's flight, such as unforecasted
icing or turbulence. Another example would include ra-
dar indications of intense precipitation when the pilot of
an aircraft did not have radar equipment. The controller
should recognize such an unknown fact as information of
significance to a pilot and should know that the pilot did
1987] 815
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not have such information available to him at the time of
his preflight weather briefing. The plaintiffs' ATC expert
typically suggests that the controller must foresee and
bring to the pilot's attention anything unknown to the pi-
lot, even as a result of the pilot's gross or ordinary negli-
gence. Such a suggestion contradicts the aviation concept
of PIG responsibility which assumes that pilots can capa-
bly conduct their flights. The ATC system relies on the
concept of PIG responsibility.
B. A Further Dilution of the PIC Concept - VFR Flight and
Rudelson v. United States
Though still objectionable, the judicial inroads into the
PIC concept are somewhat easier to accept when applied
to an aviation accident occurring in instrument weather
conditions (IFR), in which the pilot ostensibly flies
"blind." The understandable sympathy felt by the public
for individuals burdened by the loss of sight is analogous
to the sympathy felt by the courts for the pilot flying
"blind" in IFR weather conditions. Such judicial inroads
into the PIC concept are more difficult to accept, though,
when applied to an accident that occurred under visual
flight conditions (VFR). The "see and be seen" concept
established by the FAA for VFR flight has generally re-
mained sacred over the years. This concept places a duty
on the PIC to observe other aircraft in VFR conditions
and separate himself from them because the ATC cannot
provide VFR separation. When a pilot makes a VFR flight,
a fundamental presumption arises that the pilot could see
sufficiently to plan and execute the flight or he would have
remained safely on the ground. The "see and be seen"
concept has been firmly established by history, by regula-
tory policy, by the breadth of uncontrolled airspace
throughout the United States, and by what remains of a
common law concept of duty placed on those who cannot
explain their own actions or inactions which caused the
accident. At the urging of the plaintiffs' ATC expert,
however, some courts are searching for an outlet for their
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social persuasions by placing responsibility for accidents
occurring under visual flight conditions on ATC.
The case of Rudelson v. United States48 illustrates the
search by a court for controller liability, thereby uphold-
ing the court's social persuasions. In Rudelson a Cessna
airplane piloted by Rudelson, a student aviator, and
DuVal, a flight instructor, collided in mid-air with a Piper
airplane flown by Aardema.49  The collision occurred
about a mile south of the Santa Monica, California airport
in VFR conditions at an altitude of approximately 1,000
feet.5 0 The collision resulted when Aardema entered the
traffic pattern unannounced and failed to see and avoid
the Cessna aircraft.51 The survivors of Rudelson and Aar-
dema sued the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, claiming that certain federally employed air
traffic controllers had negligently caused the collision.52
The district court found that the United States was
twenty percent at fault because its controllers failed to
scan the traffic entry corridor area of the downwind leg of
the traffic pattern during a two minute period immedi-
ately preceding the collision.5" If they had done so, they
"would have seen that the planes were in a position of
imminent peril and could have warned the pilots in time
4a 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).




" Id. The district court ruled that under California's pure comparative negli-
gence principles, student pilot Rudelson was ten percent negligent and his in-
structor DuVal twenty-five percent negligent. The pilot of the other aircraft,
Aardema, was found to be forty-five percent negligent. Id The court found
Rudelson's heirs had suffered $1,360,586.25 in losses as a result of Rudelson's
death. Id The court deducted $136,058.62 to reflect Rudelson's ten percent
negligence and $200,000 received by the Rudelson heirs in settlement of the
claims against Aardema, Aviation Unlimited and its owner, and Duval. This left a
net award of $1,024,527.63 payable to the Rudelson heirs by the United States for
the twenty percent negligence of the controllers. Id The court also found that
Aardema's heirs had suffered $542,909.14 in losses as a result of Aardema's
death. Id Because Aardema was forty-five percent negligent, the court subtracted
$244,309.11, producing a net award of $298,600.23. Id The United States was
held liable for the entire amounts of both net awards. Id
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to prevent the collision. ' 54  The Ninth Circuit, in af-
firming the district court, did not follow the FAA's PIC
concept or prior Ninth Circuit case law. Despite the fact
that the FAA operations manual did not expressly order
the controller to monitor the position of a trainer air-
craft, 55 judicial egalitarianism moved the Ninth Circuit to
reason that under "especially dangerous conditions" the
controller must take steps beyond those set forth in the
manuals. 6
The Ninth Circuit referred to the "dangerous realities"
of the entry corridor.5 7 Such a description is unrealistic
because VFR aircraft use the entry corridor as part of a
standard landing procedure thousands of times each day at
airports both with and without ATC facilities across the
United States. Occasionally pilots err, as do automobile
drivers entering or exiting highways. The placement of
controllers in a tower cab a mile or more distant from the
entry corridor, however, does not mean that the control-
lers can distinguish the respective lateral or vertical dis-
tances of entering aircraft for the purpose of separating
these aircraft. The sequencing of properly reporting VFR
aircraft is like drawing the numbered ticket at the ice
cream cone counter in that it provides a clearance order
for landing. However, such sequencing is necessarily
based on the assumption that pilots flying in visual flight
conditions will "see and avoid" other aircraft when enter-
ing the pattern for landing. The controller, located a
great distance away from the entering airplanes, cannot
determine the amount of separation between VFR air-
craft, particularly when the see and avoid concept typi-
55 The decision vaguely referred to "controllers" in the plural. In fact, any duty
rests on the controller assigned to the specific position. In Rudeson the Local
Controller was assigned to the Rudelson aircraft. The court's use of the plural
denoted a judicial impression that each aircraft enjoyed the luxury of focused at-
tention not only by the appropriate assigned controller, but also by other
controllers.
Rudeon, 602 F.2d at 1329. The implied assumption is that any flight is "dan-
gerous." This is an antiquated concept customarily rejected by courts.
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cally involves hundreds of feet. In addition, Aardema's
unannounced entry into the traffic pattern arguably pro-
vided an additional defense to the allegation that the con-
troller(s) involved should have provided some warning to
Rudelson. 58
The district court based its findings of fact on its social
judgment as to who should bear the burden of this avia-
tion accident. The Rudelson decision, affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit as not "clearly wrong," illustrates a judi-
cially-created escape from well-founded aviation law, reg-
ulations, custom and practice. It can be explained only as
a case of judicial social policy making. At one point the
Ninth Circuit, quoting the FARs, stated that "vigilance
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft
so as to see and avoid other aircraft." 59 The court went
on to state that "regulations create no exception for stu-
dent pilots," so that respective violations of the FARs by
Rudelson and DuVal consituted negligence per se.60 Fi-
nally, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[b]lind spots can be
compensated for by head movement and aircraft move-
ment," and concluded that Rudelson ought to have main-
tained a better lookout.61 Yet the court found the passive
controller twice as negligent as the actively negligent
pilot 6 2
What is the source of such anti-syllogistic logic? The
Ninth Circuit speculated that had the controller(s)
not fixed their attention upon one part of the airport area
for an unreasonable length of time, they probably would
- The Ninth Circuit held that the controller had a duty to transmit warnings by
radio or light beam to the planes. ML Evidence of a radio warning would have
provided a strong defense to the allegation of controller negligence, but use of
the light beam to warn the pilots in either aircraft would have been senseless,
particularly for the pilot in the DuVal-Rudelson aircraft whose "attention would
probably be distracted from time to time by the teaching exercises." Id The sug-
gestion that light beams would have been a sufficient warning are testament to the
exaggerations of the ATC experts who do not know what goes on in the cockpit.
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have seen the unannounced Piper, which was plainly visi-
ble in a clear sky, in time to warn the Cessna by radio and
the Piper by light gun. The [district] court also found that
prompt action by the controllers probably would have pre-
vented the collision."63
The court added insult to the PIC concept by reasoning
that "the pilots' negligence did not break the chain of cau-
sation because their failure to see and avoid each other's
aircraft was foreseeable by the controllers."' Neither an
aviation law concept nor a regulatory practice and proce-
dure supported that rationale. The rationale is supported
only by some falsely charitable notion that the court can
twist FARs and pilot/controller practices and procedures
to support its moral convictions.
Unfortunately, Rudelson is a significant decision because
both the district court and the Ninth Circuit disregarded
the fundamental aviation concepts and the administrative
system established by the FAA, that arm of the executive
branch of government which possesses the technical ex-
pertise and the discretionary powers necessary to estab-
lish aviation standards. The Rudelson courts, relying on the
factual testimony of ATC experts, readily circumvented
the FAA's aviation standards.
In Foss v. United States65 the Ninth Circuit unfortunately
gave added weight to its position that a controller bears
responsibility for collisions occuring in visual flight condi-
tions. Foss involved a pilot's collision with a radio tower
in VFR weather conditions near the Fullerton, California
airport.66 A right-hand pattern for Runway 24 and a left-
hand pattern for Runway 6 were in use on the day of the
accident. An 819-foot radio tower was located approxi-
mately two miles north of the threshold of Runway 6.67
Though the FAA does not establish mandatory airport
63 Id at 1330.
- Id.
63 623 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1980).
"Id. at 104.
07 Id. The tower's placement was therefore near the end of the downwind leg
prior to the left turn to base for Runway 6, and, conversely, near the beginning of
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traffic pattern altitudes, it had published a traffic pattern
for Fullerton Airport calling for a recommended 800-foot
downwind approach for Runway 24.65 The controller
gave the pilot a VFR clearance for Runway 6. The pilot
flew the downwind leg for Runway 6 into the setting sun
at an altitude of approximately 800 feet and collided with
the 819-foot radio tower.69 The district court, affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit, found the controller(s) negligent in fail-
ing to broadcast a general warning to all aircraft in the
area regarding the hazard of the KFI tower during the pe-
riod of reduced visibility due to the sun position and a
haze layer.70 The United States appealed the district
court's finding that the pilot was not negligent to some
degree.7 1
The United States argued "that under California law
any violation of statute, or agency regulation, is negli-
gence per se, and that the pilot in this case violated appli-
cable regulations of the F.A.A."' 72 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed with the United States' contention that the pilot
violated applicable regulations and therefore did not find
the pilot negligent per se. 73 The United States further ar-
gued that the pilot violated both the regulation requiring
that the pilot familiarize himself "with all available infor-
mation" concerning the traffic pattern and tower location,
and the regulation providing for the PIC's direct responsi-
bility for, and final authority as to, the operation of the
aircraft.7 4 Finally, the United States contended that under
these regulations the pilot had a duty to see and avoid the
tower in the VFR conditions. 75 The court did not accept
the FAA's "broad interpretation of the FAA regula-
the downwind leg leading to the customary right urn to the base leg for Runway
24.
08 Id
-' Id at 104-05.
70 Id at 105.
7 Id
72 I
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tions."' 6 It cited Spaulding v. United States for the rule that
the standard of care for the controllers and the pilot is
concurrent." Yet the Ninth Circuit in Foss avoided the
only logical conclusion as to pilot negligence from the
rule in Spaulding by stating "we find nothing in Spaulding
that suggests that concurrent responsibility always results
in concurrent liability, or compels a conclusion that the
pilot is always negligent when an air crash occurs. 7 8
The conclusion that a local pilot in VFR conditions can
hit a tower without being negligent is absurd. It directly
contradicts both the aviation system implemented by the
FAA, and earlier Ninth Circuit language ruling that a vio-
lation of regulations does constitute negligence per se. The
decision does not follow common sense. Although the
immutable "see and avoid" regulatory responsibility still
exists, the holding in Foss resulted in the disappearance
from Ninth Circuit caselaw of any percentage of pilot neg-
ligence even though conditions made such pilot negli-
gence obvious.
C. A judicial rejection of the regulatory PIC concept: Daley v.
United States
Daley v. United States 7 is a textbook example of a district
court's rejection of the PIC concept. The district court's
76 Id.
7, Id. (citing Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972)).
78 Id
79 792 F.2d 1081 (11 th Cir. 1986). The plaintiffs were the widows and children
of the pilot and his two passengers. A synopsis of the appellate history of the case
disclosed that subsequent to the three member panel decision of the Eleventh
Circuit, the Department of Justice attorney with primary responsibility for trial
and appeal of the case left the Government for private practice. The writer as-
sisted in the trial of the case, as well as in preparation of the appellate brief, and
subsequent to the Eleventh Circuit panel decision, the Chief Counsel's Office of
the FAA, requested that a petition for rehearing en banc be filed with the Eleventh
Circuit, or that a petition for writ of certiorari be filed with the Supreme Court (de-
spite the improbability of success). The petition for rehearing was not filed, and
both the Torts Branch and Civil Division of the Department of Justice recom-
mended to the Solicitor General against petitioning for a writ of certiorari. No peti-
tion was filed because the case was felt to essentially involve only a review of facts
in determining whether controller negligence was a proximate cause of the acci-
dent. In addition, the arguable presence of a state law legal issue as to the signifi-
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holding in Daley is so factually biased that it provides a
classic study in judicial justification for what appears to
have been a predetermined holding by the district court.
The decision will unfortunately serve as authority for the
growing number of aviation accident cases which will cite
Daley for the technically insupportable, judicially-created
duties of ATC. These judicially-created duties find their
basis in convoluted judicial reasoning which ignores ob-
jective facts and lacks the support of any recognized sense
of duty within America's aviation system.
In Daley the Twin Beechcraft airplane N65V collided
with a guy wire of a television transmission antenna
tower.80 The collision occurred when Mellish, the pilot,
attempted to execute a missed approach with an inopera-
tive engine in instrument weather conditions to Runway
28 of the Gainesville Regional Airport, Gainesville, Flor-
ida."' The district court found that the failure of the con-
troller(s) at Gainesville to ascertain the location of N65V
after it reported engine failure on the missed approach,
and to warn N65V's pilot of its unsafe proximity to the
television tower, constituted negligence and proximately
caused the crash.8 2 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.83
Mellish, a retired military fighter pilot veteran residing
in Tampa, had flown for Tampa Air Center, Inc., the
owner of the aircraft, for several years.8 4 He had previ-
ously flown into and out of Gainesville Regional Air-
port.8 5 He had more than 8,000 hours of flight time and
held a commercial airplane certificate with ratings for
flight in instrument weather conditions (IFR) and in
cance of the ATC manual in determining the standard of care required, was not
felt by the Department ofJustice to justify the petition.
o Id. at 1082.
8 Id. at 1082-83. A missed approach is a relatively common procedure flown
by the pilot when he cannot complete his approach for whatever reason. Daley v.
United States, No. 81-i 117, slip op. at 17 (M.D. Fla. April 8, 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d
1081 (11th Cir. 1986).
82 Daky, 792 F.2d at 1083.
" Id
Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 1.
SId at 9.
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multi-engine aircraft like the one involved in the acci-
dent.86 PIC Mellish had been trained, tested, and re-
quired as part of his certification by the FAA, to execute a
missed approach after the loss of one engine, the precise cir-
cumstance of this case. Situations involving the loss of
one engine occur hundreds, if not thousands, of times
each year throughout the United States.
ATC trains air traffic controllers to assume that the FAA
has tested the PIG of a multi-engine aircraft on his ability
to maintain control of the aircraft before he acquired
multi-engine rating. Furthermore, controllers are trained
to expect a pilot to properly perform a missed approach.
Every instrument-rated pilot like Mellish has received
training and testing in completing an approach or missed
approach in adverse weather conditions and is required to
be able to do so by the FARs.87
In Finding of Fact 15 the district court found that be-
cause the flight was an air taxi flight for hire in instrument
meteorological conditions, the FAA required pilot David
Mellish to fly with either a copilot or an autopilot.88 Mel-
lish had not checked out in the use of the autopilot for
three years, though the FARs required he do so every six
months.8 9 The district court found in Finding of Fact 30
8o lId See 14 C.F.R. § § 61.121-.141 (1986) for the requirements for the issu-
ance of commercial airplane certificates. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.45 (1986) for a discus-
sion of flight tests. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.63(d)(3)(i) (1986) for a discussion of
requirements for multi-engine airplanes. Air traffic controllers are trained to rely
on factors such as Mellish's multi-engine rating, acknowledged in Finding of Fact
4, and the FAA's mandatory training, testing and certification of Mellish to fly the
aircraft even if an engine-loss occurred.
a7 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.116 (1986).
- Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 5. The Tampa Air Center (TAC) aircraft in-
volved in Daley, bearing registration number N65V, was a venerable twin-engine
Beach 18 manufactured in 1956. The FAA certified TAC pursuant to 14 C.F.R.
§ 135 (1986) to operate certain aircraft as an air taxi/charter operator, subject to
numerous operational limitations. One of those limitations was that for each taxi
operation conducted under 14 C.F.R. Part 135 (1986), TAC's aircraft must be
piloted either by two properly qualified pilots or by one properly qualified pilot
and a properly functioning autopilot.
no The court took judicial notice of that FAR, promulgated pursuant to the
FAA's statutory duty to "promote safety of flight of civilian aircraft," found in the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1982). The district court ig-
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that although Mellish had not received a current check
ride with respect to the use of the autopilot, he was knowl-
edgeable and proficient regarding its use.90
The pretrial discovery disclosed entries on the log of
N65V that the autopilot had not functioned for a consid-
erable period of time with no record of repair.91 Despite
the absence of any record that the autopilot had been re-
paired, the court found no "persuasive evidence" that the
autopilot did not function. 2 Furthermore, the court
found no evidence as to whether Mellish used or needed
to use the autopilot and "no persuasive evidence that the
operational status of the autopilot or the use thereof were
nored the regulatory requirement and its purpose-that a second pilot or auto-
pilot would ease the pilot's workload in controlling the aircraft, particularly in the
event an emergency should arise. The Eleventh Circuit blindly followed the spe-
cious reasoning in ignoring the purpose for promulgation of the regulations. The
fact that 14 C.F.R. § 135.105 (1986) was promulgated for the very purpose of
easing a single pilot's workload in a multi-engine aircraft was lost in the confusion
exemplified in Finding of Fact 65 in which the court found that Meilish "complied
to the best of his ability" with communications received from air traffic control-
lers. This Finding of Fact evidenced a lack of common sense. If the court had
used common sense it would necessarily have found that a pilot in an emergency
has little time to operate the controls of the aircraft, and less time to communicate
with ATC or to review the approach plate. The only plausible explanation for
Mellish's subsequent misidentification of the outer marker for the ILS 28 ap-
proach at Gainesville was his inability to deal with the mounting complexities of
the instrument approach by himself.
o Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 8. 14 C.F.R. § 135. 2 97(g)(3) (1986) (man-
dated twelve month autopilot proficiency check).
91 Witnesses for the United States, including pilots who had previously flown
N65V, testified as to the history of the autopilot and its condition on October 24,
1980. The district court severely limited this testimony when it dismissed the
third party action by the United States against TAC.
In Finding of Fact 23 the court found that Mellish was not an aircraft mechanic
and had no responsibilities with respect to maintenance of N65V. Daley, No. 81-
1117, slip op. at 7. Though Mellish was not a mechanic, as part of the PIC's
preflight inspection he was required to familiarize himself with the aircraft log, to
review reported discrepancies and log sign-offs of actual maintenance performed
by a certified mechanic. 14 C.F.R. § 91.5 (1986). The district court recognized
that it was the habit and routine practice of Mellish to conduct a complete and
thorough preflight inspection in Finding of Fact 32. Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op.
at 8. The district court could not point to any real evidence regarding the factual
and expert opinion found in the NTSB report and elsewhere that the autopilot
was not functioning on the date of the accident.
- Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 8.
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issues material to the cause of the crash."93 The court's
logic is contradicted by the regulatory intent behind the
FARs mandating Mellish's use of an autopilot. Arguably,
if Mellish did not need the navigational help of the
autopilot, the impact of N65V with the guy wire must have
been voluntary.
On October 24, 1980, N65V departed from Tampa In-
ternational Airport at 7:05 a.m. on a chartered business
trip to Lake City, Florida. 4 On board were pilot Mellish
and passenger Stephens.95 The aircraft flew on a VFR
flight to Bartow, Florida where it picked up Daley, a sec-
ond passenger.96 After departing Bartow Airport, Mellish
filed an IFR flight plan for the flight to Lake City, Flor-
ida.97  FAA regulations barred Mellish from even con-
ducting the flight to Lake City because the Lake City
Airport did not have an officially recognized weather re-
porting facility. 98 The district court noted the "poor
weather conditions" at Lake City in Finding of Fact 51,9'
but ignored Mellish's violation of the FAA regulation
when he attempted an instrument approach to Lake City
Airport. Both Mellish's willingness to fly without a sec-
ond pilot or functioning autopilot, and his departure for
Lake City from Bartow, illustrated his lack of care in pre-
93 IL
- Daley, 792 F.2d at 1083.
5 Id.
06 Id.
9, Dairy, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 8. The FARs require that the pilot file an IFR
flight plan for operation in controlled airspace in instrument weather conditions.
14 C.F.R. § 91.115 (1986).
09 14 C.F.R. § 135.225(a) (1986). "No pilot may begin an instrument approach
procedure to an airport unless-(1) (t]hat airport has a weather reporting facility
operated by the U.S. National Weather Service, a source approved by U.S. Na-
tional Weather Service, or a source approved by the Administrator." Id
- See Dairy, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 18 for Finding of Fact 51. Mellish's viola-
tion of 14 C.F.R. § 135.225(a) (1986) created the basis for opinion testimony by
the United States' pilot expert about Mellish's negligence in his preflight plan-
ning. In Finding of Fact 58 the district court found that at the time of the accident
the weather at Gainesville Regional Airport was poor with a fog cover contribut-
ing to poor visibility. Id at 21. The court's reference to poor weather and visibil-
ity in Finding of Fact 58 misconstrued the responsibilities of the PIC in the district
court's subsequent analysis.
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flight planning which later swelled to recklessness in his
approach to the Gainesville Airport. The district court's
regulatory oblivion cannot disguise PIC negligence from
the very inception of the flight.
As a properly certified PIC, Mellish had been trained,
tested, and was required by the "force of law" FARs to fly
on the instruments and to make an instrument approach
under Instrument Flight Rules. The pilots and controllers
comprising the FAA's aviation system assume that a pilot
like Mellish will specifically comply with those "force of
law" regulations. If controllers and other pilots could not
rely on a pilot like Mellish doing precisely what the FARs
mandate in instrument weather conditions, the entire avi-
ation system of the United States would fall apart. If a
pilot did not follow the predetermined procedures as ex-
pected there would be no security in the clearance pro-
vided by controllers to small and large aircraft alike.
Due to adverse weather conditions, N65V could not
land at Lake City.100 Mellish reported to the FAA Jack-
sonville Air Route Traffic Control Center that he could
not land at Lake City because of weather.10 ' The court
found that the Jacksonville Center "directed" him to pro-
ceed to Gainesville Regional Airport.102  The weather
conditions at Gainesville were also poor with limited visi-
bility.'0 At 9:16 a.m. Mellish contacted the Gainesville
approach controller and advised the controller that he
was "holding" at a particular intersection at a prescribed
altitude of 3,000 feet.10 4 At 9:28 Mellish responded that
- Daley, 792 F.2d at 1083.
- Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 9.
,02 Id The confusion of the district court as to the responsibilities of the PIC is
seen in Finding of Fact 38, where the court found that Mellish was "directed" to
Gainesville, Florida. The pilot elects where he wants to land, and the controllers
coordinate with appropriate FAA facilities in order to provide "separation" from
other aircraft. Controllers simply provided a clearance to Mellish for his flight to
Gainesville. They did not, and could not, "direct" him to fly to any airport. The
court misunderstood that it was the election of Mellish as PIC to fly to Gainesville.
103 The weather at Gainesville included a visibility of between one-half to one
mile, fog, and a ceiling of clouds 400 feet above the ground.
104 Mellish's ability to identify himself from a particular intersection, like subse-
quent maneuvers, was achieved through Mellish's use of electronic navigational
828 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
he had received another radio navigation aid "suitable for
navigation," and at 9:29 the controller cleared him to that
radio beacon. At 9:32 a.m. Mellish again contacted the
Gainesville approach controller and asked, "Should I get
out my ILS (Instrument Landing System) ah twenty eight
approach?" This question indicated Mellish's familiarity
with the Gainesville Airport, and, more significantly, that
he knew the probable runway in use (28) and had the in-
strument approach plate for that runway with him on
board N65V.'0 5 The controller immediately told Mellish
that Mellish could indeed expect to land on ILS Runway
28.106
The district court defied common sense in its analysis of
the ILS 28 approach plate.'07 It concluded that the ap-
proach plate was erroneous, that it misled Mellish, and
that it contributed to his misunderstanding as to how to
conduct the missed approach.10 8 However, the approach
plate Mellish used clearly depicted the very tower he
hit.'0 9 The court did not comment on Mellish's previous
flights into Gainesville.110 The written instructions on the
approach plate were as clear as possible.1 1' This pub-
equipment on board N65V. The use of such equipment is a regulatory require-
ment, is expected by controllers, and serves to illustrate the means used by pilots
to maintain control of their aircraft pursuant to FARs. This instrument identifica-
tion of a specific point in the air at a specific altitude becomes more significant
later in the flight and later in the district court's decision.
-05 See Daey, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 11. This approach plate depicted the 869-
foot tower (1049 feet above sea level) which Mellish hit. It also depicted five other
towers with listed heights located close to the airport. The district court acknowl-
edged Mellish's use of the approach plate in Finding of Fact 63. See Daley, No. 81-
1117, slip op. at 22. A pilot typically places such a plate in front of him for easy
reference.
10D aley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 11.
107 See id.
o8 Id. at 44-49.
1-9 Id. at 48.
1o See id at 9. Mellish's pilot's log disclosed that he had flown into Gainesville
twelve times.
:11 The district court found that the missed approach required a turn, and the
plan view of that procedure did not depict a turn. Id at 44. Instead the plan
depicted the path of the published missed approach with a broken straight arrow
rather than a curved arrow depicting a left turn. Id at 6. The U.S. specifications
(IACC) in effect, however, provided for the straight arrow depicted on the ap-
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lished regulatory procedure directed Mellish, in "force of
law" regulatory language requiring pilot compliance, to
climb to 600 feet and make a climbing left turn to 2,000
feet." 2 More importantly, the approach plate dearly de-
picted to any pilot, regardless of what type of missed approach he
conducted, the existence of two towers straight ahead, at least one of
which had an altitude of 1049 feet. (869'AGL). However, the
court found the FAA negligent in its depiction of the
missed approach on the approach plate, 13 because the
approach plate depicted the path of the published missed
approach with a broken straight arrow rather than a
curved arrow." 4 The court's reasoning severely tested
logic when it found that the pilot's reliance on the depic-
tion of the straight arrow constituted a proximate cause of
the crash,"a5 but did not find the pilot negligent in hitting
the tower to which that straight arrow directly led.
At 9:40 the controller instructed Mellish to contact the
Gainesville Tower," 6 a nonradar facility at the airport.
The Gainesville Tower relied on the sequencing of arriv-
ing Instrument Flight Plan aircraft by Gainesville Ap-
proach which coordinated their arrivals with the Center.
At 9:40 the approach controller further instructed Mellish
to change to the Gainesville Tower radio frequency and to
report when he reached the outer marker (the "fix")." 7  The
proach plate, and no charting experts testified to the contrary. Subsequent to the
crash of N65V the government revised the approach plate to show a curved arrow
instead of a straight arrows. Id. at 45. Finding of Fact 22 disclosed the weight
given by the court to the post-accident remedial measure rule. I& at 7. The
NTSB made a post-accident recommendation that a curved arrow to the left be
utilized, as displayed on a privately published approach plate. Charting experts of
the U.S. disagreed with the NTSB conclusion as to the IACC specification, and the
U.S. objected to the court's admission of such evidence which violated 49 U.S.C.
§ 1441(e) (1982) and Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
112 See Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 45.
,s Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 22.
114 Id. at 6.
I d at 22.
116 See i& at 13. (Again the court used the words "instructed" or "directed"
erroneously. See supra note 102). FARs required Mellish to contact the tower so
that the controller would know, for separation purposes, the location of N65V. See
14 C.F.R. § 91.75 (1986).
1'7 Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 13. The controller instructed Mellish to "re-
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nonradar tower controller (local controller) relied upon
the total 4.7 nautical mile (5.4 statutory mile) distance
from the outer marker to the runway to determine the lo-
cation of an aircraft when a pilot reported that he had
reached the outer marker. The nonradar tower controller
used a pilot's report of reaching that point as a basis for
determining the distance between that aircraft and other
aircraft so that the controller could meet the minimum
separation criteria to avoid a mid-air collision. At 9:41 the
nonradar tower controller (local controller) asked Mellish
for an estimate as to when he would reach the outer
marker, and Mellish responded "about two minutes."'" 8
At 9:43 the local controller (LC) advised Mellish that, in
the event he could not complete his approach to land, he
was to exercise an alternate missed approach procedure
rather than the standard missed approach depicted on the
approach plate, because another aircraft was conducting a
standard missed approach. 1 9 At 9:44 Mellish reported
that he had reached the outer marker, and the LC imme-
diately cleared him to land on Runway 28.120 At 9:46:41
port the outer marker inbound." It A pilot making an instrument approach,
regardless of how poor the weather, must report at each "designated reporting
point" (fix) on the approach plate or at those points specified by ATC. 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.125(a) (1986). The outer marker, depicted on the approach plate, was lo-
cated on an inbound 281 degree magnetic heading 4.2 nautical miles from the
middle marker. The middle marker was located on the same magnetic heading .5
of a nautical mile from the threshold of Runway 28. In aviation, nautical miles in
distance and knots in airspeed are standard measures. A nautical mile (NM)
equals 1.15 of the 5280-foot statutory mile, so the 4.7 NM would equal 5.4 statu-
tory miles. See BLAcK's LAw DicnONARY 895 (5th ed. 1979).
- Daley, No. 81-1117, slip. op. at 13.
,to Id Both the missed approach and alternate missed approach procedures are
promulgated by regulation. See 14 C.F.R. § 97 (1986). The standard missed ap-
proach procedure written on the approach plate stated: "MISSED APPROACH:
Climb to 600 then climbing left turn to 2,000 direct GNV VORTAC and hold."
(The GNV VORTAC is located on a 238 degree magnetic heading 11.6 nautical
miles from the outer marker).
120 Daiey, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 14. The court found in Finding of Fact 29 that
N65V was "airworthy" when it left Tampa. Id at 8. This finding is without sup-
port. The NTSB's post accident investigation found the cause of the pilot's loss of
an engine. Testimony of the investigation related to a substantial amount of for-
eign debris in the left engine fuel filter. The conclusion in Finding of Fact 29 was
"clearly wrong," since one engine failed.
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Mellish advised the LC that he was executing a "missed
approach," which the LC acknowledged at 9:46:45.121 At
9:46:51 the LC no longer had a potential conflict with the
prior aircraft executing the standard missed approach
procedure for Runway 28, so the LC instructed Mellish to
execute the same.1 22 Mellish failed to acknowledge re-
ceipt of that transmission, so at 9:47:05 the LC asked,
"[D]id you copy Sir?"123 At 9:47:07 Mellish responded,
"Roger I've got a little trouble here.' 24 This prompted
the LC to immediately ask Mellish at 9:47:10 to advise him
of the problem so the LC would know what assistance he
could offer.125 The following transmissions 26 occurred in
the fifty-seven to sixty-two second time period between
the first transmission from Mellish identifying his problem
and the accident time of 9:48:10-15 as established by the
plaintiffs' expert's opinion:
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9:47:13 N65V Got an engine out127
9:47:16 LCL Six five victor roger understand you
have an engine out
9:47:28 LCL Six five victor if you're receiving Wynds
[outer marker radio navigation aid] you
can proceed back to Wynds via direct
maintain ah two thousand if able sir
and you're cleared for the ILS runway
two eight approach1 28
9:47:54 LCL Twin Beech six five victor Gainesville
Tower
9:47:56 N65V Six five victor I'm still with you but I'm
having trouble getting the engine
feathered' 29
9:48:01 LCL Roger did you copy the clearance sir ' s0
if able maintain two thousand and
you're - to Wynds outbound and
you're cleared for the ILS runway two
eight approach.
9:48:08 LCL Six five victor
9:48:15 LCL Six five victor if you've got time IEd like
your souls on board and the ah amount
of fuel you have sir.
127 Id at 14-15.
128 Idr at 14. This priority clearance to N65V to return to the approach for
Runway 28 consumed approximately ten seconds. After determining that no
threat of a mid-air collision between N65V and other aircraft existed, the local
controller's first duty was to provide N65V with an emergency clearance to return
to land at Gainesville. The LC would have appreciated Mellish's concentration in
the missed approach, could not have told him how to fly the aircraft, and would
have been reluctant to ask unnecessary questions while Mellish remained busy.
129 Id at 15. Technically, the propeller, not the engine, is "feathered." The
propellor is "feathered" by twisting the blades edgewise into the wind. This
reduces the drag of the windmilling propellor.
,30 Idt The LC had no way of knowing N65V's precise altitude, its rate of climb,
the pilot's capabilities, or whether the engine could be restarted, etc. Therefore,
in the forty-four second period from the time Mellish reported that he had lost an
engine to this clearance at 9:48:01, the LC would have been engrossed in assuring
separation of N65V from other aircraft. In addition, almost four minutes had
passed from the 9:44:14 time when Mellish reported "at the marker." Id at 14.
Based on an approximate speed of 120 knots (two miles per minute) the LC would
have reasonably assumed that N65V was about one mile beyond the threshold of
the 6500 foot Runway 28. Therefore, the LC would have assumed N65V was still
over the Gainesville Airport.
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The parties did not dispute that N65V struck a guy wire
of a television transmission antenna tower located some
seven miles west of the Gainesville Regional Airport at ap-
proximately 9:48:10-15 a.m. t s1 First, this paper will at-
tempt to unravel the convoluted reasoning of the district
court. Then the author will make a proposal to remove, or
largely eliminate, the injustice such a decision plays on the
taxpayers of the United States, whether the decision was
prompted by the overload of the courts or by the unwill-
ingness of the courts to comprehend the objective facts.
In the fifty-seven to sixty-two second period between
the 9:47:13 report of an engine out and the 9:48:10-15
time of the accident, a reasonable person would conclude
that the LC had a rather short period of time to assess the
severity of the emergency Mellish confronted and the na-
ture of the assistance Mellish needed. This short time pe-
riod is coupled with the LC's reasonable expectation that
Mellish would comply with FARs and customary pilot pro-
cedures, rather than continuing to fly straight ahead for
seven miles at a low altitude. The district court erred in
ruling in Finding of Fact 49 that "[t]he evidence was in-
conclusive as to the location of N65V when the missed
approach was declared."132 The Eleventh Circuit com-
pounded that error when it affirmed the district court's
finding that "the controllers .. .knew or should have
known, that on any of the missed approach instructions
N65V had been given it would be proceeding in a west-
bound direction that would put it in the general vicinity of
the television antenna towers" (emphasis added).133 The
Eleventh Circuit's statement was factually erroneous. Un-
is, See id at 2.
332 Id at 18.
iss Daley, 792 F.2d at 1984. Courts typically ascribe specific knowledge of the
aircraft to all the controllers when only the one controller dealing with the aircraft
actually had such specific information. In this case, the local controller was the
one controller who had specific information regarding N65V.
Furthermore, the simplistic and subjective phrase concerning "general vicinity"
is misleading because it was not made from an aviation standpoint. It is much like
saying that because the writer lives seven miles from the Washington Monument
and the White House, he lives in their neighborhood.
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fortunately, the statement serves as the focal point of the
Daley decision around which the court made the facts fit.
Finding of Fact 49 was a rather remarkable finding. 1 4
Assume that a LC does not have to anticipate a pilot's vio-
lation of a FAR.185 When Mellish reported at the marker
at 9:44:14, the LC would have to conclude, based on Mel-
lish's mandatory report of reaching the outer marker at
9:44:14 and his report of executing a missed approach at
9:46:41, that Mellish had flown about two and one-half
minutes from the outer marker located 4.7 nautical miles
from the runway. Since testimony and evidence indicated
the approximate approach speed of a properly operating
twin-engine aircraft ranges between 90-120 knots, the LC
would have reasonably approximated the position of
N65V using a simple time/distance calculation. t' 6  If
N65V reached at the outer marker at 9:44:14, two and
one-half minutes later the LC would naturally assume that
N65V had flown three and three-quarters to five miles
from the outer marker. This would place N65V from one-
half mile west of the middle marker to a point three-
tenths of a mile down Runway 28. At that point N65V
should have been some eight miles east of the tower, and
the LC would have no reason to believe that N65V had
flown into the "general vicinity" of the antenna towers.
However, the district court found that the LC should have
known N65V proceeded in that general vicinity.'8 7 The
Eleventh Circuit simply turned its head from the factual
complexities of the case in affirming the district court's
clearly erroneous findings.
Finding of Fact 55 best exemplified the district court's
13, See Daley, No. 81-I 117, slip op. at 18 for Finding of Fact 49.
13 Colorado Flying Academy, 724 F.2d at 878. All experts agreed that the LC had
no way of knowing that Mellish had erroneously reported his position. Since Mel-
lish obviously did not know his location, he could not comply with the reporting
point accuracy requirement. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.125 (1986). The courts ignored
the "force of law" of that regulation.
130 As will later be shown, information derived from the Center radar data dis-
closed Mellish's error. The district court's opinion evaded this information.
a, Daley, 792 F.2d at 1084.
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emotional leaning. This finding related to the treatment
of N65V as an "emergency" after the pilot reported an
engine out:
When the air traffic controllers in Gainesville finally con-
tacted Jacksonville [Center]" 8 after losing contact with
N65V, 1s9 to see if N65V could be located on the radar, the
first question theJacksonville controller asked was, "Okay,
where is he now?" The response made by Gainesville was
"I don't know, you got a seventy-seven squawk." The sec-
ond question asked by Jacksonville to the air traffic con-
troller in Gainesville was at 9:49:04, "What altitude is he?"
The response by Gainesville at 9:49:06 was "Ah, we gave
him two thousand." Again, at 9:49:20, Jacksonville asked
"What altitude is he?" At 9:49:22 Gainesville said, "He
was cleared for the approach and lost an engine and ah we
believe he circled back around toward Wynds at two thou-
sand." The controller at Gainesville did not know where
N65V was and had waited approximately one and one-half
minutes to seek assistance from the radar facilities at
Jacksonville. 140
138 After the 9:47:13 report of the engine out, a review of the transcript dis-
dosed that the LC needed to ask for a confirmation of that somewhat unusual
report at 9:47:16. When Mellish did not answer, the LC gave a priority clearance
to Mellish for return to Runway 28 with a ten second transmission at 9:47:28.
Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 14. The LC then consumed some sixteen seconds
to reconsider the location of N65V and the location of other aircraft on approach
to or departure from Gainesville before he tried to contract N65V at 9:47:54. Id.
at 15. N65V acknowledged the transmission at 9:47:56, and the LC responded
immediately at 9:48:01 repeating the clearance. Id. N65V acknowledged receipt
of that repeated clearance at 9:48:08, and the LC asked about a most critical factor
at 9:48:15, "if you've got time I'd like your souls on board and the ah amount of
fuel you have." I This information was necessary to determine where N65V
could fly to if the pilot was unable to land at Gainesville because of the poor
weather conditions. The seemingly morbid question as to the number of souls on
board related to the possible need for an ambulance and emergency equipment.
This question is specifically listed in the ATC manual as a question to be asked
when time permitted.
1s "Losing contact with N65V" implied that the Tower had some sort of "radar
contact" with N65V, though the LC did not have radar available. The only loss of
radio contact occurred after the last transmission from N65V at 9:48:08, two to
seven seconds before the accident. The LC obviously assumed that Mellish was
conducting the missed approach as Mellish was trained, tested, and certified to
do.
140 Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 19-20.
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The court's finding in Finding of Fact 55 contained con-
fusion, misstatement, and factual error. The Eleventh
Circuit's affirmation of the finding suggested that appeal-
ing a case so factually complex is ineffective because most
judges are not familiar with the technical subject matter.
Obviously, without radar the LC could not have known or
have been expected to know the specfic location or altitude
of N65V. The district court ignored the regulatory ap-
proach plate procedures and the methodology of such
regulatory instrument approach procedures reviewed in
general terms by numerous courts.
If the court had not ignored such procedures it would
have understood that if Mellish had actually been at the
outer marker (Wynds) at 9:44:14, his assumed regulatory
altitude would have been 1700 feet above sea level.1 41
The regulatory approach plate procedures then required
(and the controller assumed) N65V to descend to Runway
28 on a glide slope angle of three degrees for 4.2 nautical
miles to the middle marker. Thus, for the safety of other
aircraft, the LC had to assume that every pilot would con-
duct the approach along the 281 degree localizer course,
and descend three degrees down the glide slope at the
known customary rate of speed for a twin-engine turbo-
propeller aircraft. Until Mellish declared a missed ap-
proach at 9:46:41, the LC would have assumed that Mel-
lish was making the approach required by the approach
plate procedures. At the missed approach point (the mid-
dle marker one-half mile from the runway threshold),
Mellish had to decide whether he could locate the runway
environment for the purpose of continuing the approach
to land at a minimum altitude of 326 feet.1 42
14, The Gainesville Regional Airport is at an altitude of 152 feet above sea level.
342 The approach plate provided a speed/time table for the pilot to compute the
time it would take him to fly the 4.7 miles from the Final Approach Fix (outer
marker) to the Missed Approach Point (near the middle marker). These figures
disclosed 3:08 minutes to fly the 4.7 miles at a speed of ninety knots and 2:21
minutes at a speed of 120 knots. The LC acknowledged his expectation of these
approach times by testifying that when Mellish declared a missed approach at
9:46:41 the LC assumed that N65V was at the Missed Approach Point. When
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The LC had dealt with hundreds of similar aircraft mak-
ing such instrument approaches annually and has the ILS
Runway 28 approach plate for such landings available.
Depending on the number of aircraft, separation of air-
craft required the LC to make mental calculations relat-
ing to 1) the time the pilot reported the regulatory Final
Approach Fix (middle marker), 2) the approximate ap-
proach speed, and 3) the time when the pilot declared
that he was executing a missed approach. Those mental
calculations as to distance included the minimum altitude
of 326 feet at the Missed Approach Point. The LC had no
indication of any problem with N65V between the 9:44:14
report "at the marker" and the 9:46:41 declaration of a
"missed approach." The courts did not recognize an
emergency existed until Mellish reported an engine out at
9:47:13 - fifty-seven to sixty-two seconds before the acci-
dent.1 43 This fact is contrary to the court's finding that
the LC "waited approximately one and one-half minutes"
to contact the Center.1 4 4 In fact, a review of the record
disclosed that in the fifty-seven to sixty-two second time
period from the creation of the "emergency" until the ac-
cident only a sixteen second break existed (from 9:47:38
to 9:47:54) during which the LC could physically have
spoken to anyone other than Mellish.1 45
In Finding of Fact 55 the court ignored the amount of
time that the LC necessarily consumed when the LC con-
tacted the Center to obtain radar assistance. The LC con-
sumed several seconds explaining the problem,
describing the aircraft and its general expected location,
and conveying the understandable uncertainty as to its ev-
act location or altitude.1 46 Because Mellish erroneously
reported that he had reached the outer marker at 9:44:14,
the LC could not have known the location of N65V. Obvi-
Mellish reported an engine out at 9:47:11, the LC assumed N65V was "just at the
western edge of the airport."
1.0 Daley, 792 F.2d at 1984.
14, Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 20.
145 See supra note 136 for a review of the record.
,i- See Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 19-20.
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ously Mellish did not know his location either. Regardless
of when the LC contacted the Center, the LC could not
possibly have told the appropriate Center controller pre-
cisely where to look for N65V. 147
The testimony of all experts confirmed the fact that
from the LC's first notice of an emergency at 9:47:13, a
span of fifty-seven to sixty-two seconds existed in which to
act. However, the transcript indicated that realistically the
LC had no more than thirty-four to thirty-nine seconds in
which to act. 148  Furthermore, these estimates assumed
that the LC devoted his time and thoughts to the safety of
only N65V. Accepting for the purpose of comment the
court's finding that fifty-seven to sixty-two seconds passed
between the declaration of emergency and the accident,
the transmission to and from the LC and N65V necessar-
ily consumed all but sixteen seconds.1 49 Thus, the LC ar-
guably had approximately sixteen seconds to either 1)
explain the problem to his flight data controller and call
for and await the arrival of his area supervisor for expla-
nation, or 2) contact the Center himself by interphone.
The only evidence indicated that it would have taken at
least five seconds to grab the telephone, press the appro-
priate number, and await the answer at the Center. Find-
147 A center radar target like N65V unidentified at the Center because no longer
part of their computer data (printed on a flight progress strip) would be unknown
to them. Without an operating encoding altimeter on board the aircraft on a par-
ticular transponder code (which N65V was not), the Center controller would not
be able to identify the target as being N65V and would not be able to determine
whether the target was at the altitude of the minimum radar coverage of 10,000 -
feet.
148 During the period of approximately ten seconds between the termination of
the LC's transmission at 9:47:16 and the next transmission by the LC at 9:47:28,
the LC was obviously awaiting a response from Mellish. See DaLey, No. 81-1117,
slip op. at 14. Finding of Fact 56 stated that the ATC manual "requires that as a
minimum, the air traffic controller should determine the pilot's desires." Id at 20.
That is true, but it is unknown why the court bothered to trouble itself with that
observation.
I4 The fifty-seven to sixty-two seconds span of time, taken from the testimony
of plaintiffs' air traffic expert, is obviously generous to plaintiffs' case. A more
realistic time would begin at the close of the LC's first priority clearance to Mellish
ending at 9:47:36. That time would leave no more than thirty-four to thirty-nine
seconds in which to act.
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ing of Fact 55 indicated that the LC would then have had
to ask for the appropriate Center sector controller and re-
lay to him the customary information assumed about any
aircraft declaring a missed approach.1 50 The Center con-
troller would have assumed the pilot executed the missed
approach pursuant to the regulatory missed approach
procedures and would have looked to his scope for an un-
known (nonradar identified) target heading southwest to-
ward the Gainesville (GNV) VORTAC. Once the Center
controller found no unknown target fitting the flight path
description, he just might have located an unknown target
at a point some six or more miles west of the airport on a
generally westerly heading. Since the Center controller
did not have the towers depicted on his scope, he would
not have known that the target's direction headed towards
the towers. We must further assume that the Center con-
troller could have explained the location of the target to
the LC at Gainesville, and that the LC would have con-
cluded that the target was N65V in time to warn Mellish of
two towers on his approximate route of flight. The dis-
trict court's conclusion that even a small part of this coor-
dination could physically have been completed in
approximately sixteen seconds was pure folly. Further-
more, the Eleventh Circuit's blind affirmance of the dis-
trict court made a sad statement about its appellate
function.
The district court based its justification for its factual
aberrations in part on the limited radar data compiled af-
ter 9:06:16 when the Center told Mellish that "radar serv-
ices terminated" and suggested he contact Gainesville
Approach. This data was retrieved from the Center's In-
terim Track Analysis Program (ITAP) after the acci-
dent.1 ,51 Such radar data is generally accurate, provided
l See Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 19-20. The district and appellate courts
obliquely transformed the standard missed approach of N65V into something al-
most mystical. In fact, Finding of Fact 46 described the missed approach as "a
relatively common procedure that is flown by the pilot when he is unable to com-
plete his approach for any reason." Id at 17.
is' The retrieval of the data was part of the post-accident investigation. The
1987] 839
840 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
the aircraft maintained a sufficient altitude.
The ITAP radar data obtained from the Center directly
after the accident contradicted not only certain findings of
fact, but also the reasoning of both courts. The Center
recorded the radar data of N65V on the ITAP printout
using targets registered at twelve second radar sweeps
based on Limited Data Blocks.152 The radar data in that
exhibit created the only real evidence as to the flight path
and altitude of N65V. Admittedly, because the Center did
not control N65V, and N65V flew too low for Full Data
Blocks, several of the radar hits were missing. As a result,
the altitude of N65V was missing for certain locations.
However, at the time of each recorded hit, N65V flew at a
particular latitude and longitude at a certain altitude (ex-
cept for those missing altitude returns). When, for in-
stance, the radar recorded the N65V target at points A,B,
and D, the approximate location and altitude of N65V at
the missing radar hit point C could be computed using
common sense extrapolations which the courts chose to
avoid.
The ITAP data disclosed that when Mellish erroneously
stated his position at the outer marker at 9:44:14, N65V
was located some six miles further west toward the towers
than the LC could have known. The LC relied upon Mel-
lish's misrepresentation in attempting to assist Mellish.
Both courts simply ignored these facts. The district court
concluded that "[t]he evidence does not support a finding
that the pilot was negligent in declaring the marker. '",
The court offered "several equally plausible theories ...
pertaining to the issue of where N65V was at 9:44:14 and
data permitted a reconstruction of the flight path of N65V, although it had several
missing radar "hits" or missing altitude reports. Reconstruction of the approxi-
mate location of N65V when Mellish declared a missed approach was relatively
simple. Though determination of the precise latitude and longitude of N65V at
the time of a missing radar hit might allow a range difference of perhaps as much
as a quarter of a mile in either direction, its approximate location and altitude were
easy to determine.
152 Trial Court Exhibit 25.
-1 Dalk, No. 81-1117. slip op. at 52.
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why the pilot declared the marker at that time."' -"
Theory I: The court's first theory provided that the pilot
falsely reported because of "either a malfunction of the
ILS system or a malfunction of the aircraft's navigation
aids. There was testimony of an ILS malfunction by the
pilot of the plane preceding N65V."' 5 In Finding of Fact
42 the court concluded that"[t]he ILS system for Runway
28 at Gainesville Regional Airport did malfunction the
morning of October 24, 1980."156 This finding was con-
tradicted by the fact that other aircraft successfully uti-
lized the ILS that morning and a certified test of the ILS
system conducted by an FAA test aircraft after the acci-
dent indicated compliance with all performance criteria.
The "malfunction" reported by the pilot of the preceding
aircraft seemingly related to a problem he experienced
with his equipment in conducting the ILS approach. The
pilot did not transmit to ATC that a problem with the
FAA's ILS ground equipment existed as required by the
FARs.- 57 The pilot landed safely. If the ILS system failed
to function properly, the pilot needed only to discontinue
his approach as required by the "force of law" FARs. 58
Theory 2: The district court theorized that Mellish "re-
ported 'at the marker' after he had passed the outer
marker and had not reached the middle marker. The pilot
received the proper signals 59 but simply did not report
on time."' 6 0 The district court then criticized Exhibit 23,
a chart constructed from the ITAP radar data with dots
representing the latitude, longitude, and altitude informa-
15 JI
"- Id See id at 10-11 for an explanation of the ILS Components in Finding of
Fact 42.
- Id at 11.
.57 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.129 (1986)
- See Delta Airlines v. United States, 561 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir.) (FAA Regu-
lations and Delta Procedures require that at decision height, the captain must de-
termine if the landing environment is in sight and whether a safe landing can be
made; if not, he must execute a missed approach), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064
(1978).
1 The pilot would receive different signals at the outer marker and middle
marker.
-G Daly, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 52-53.
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tion taken from the radar data, at times synchronized
from the radio/radar/computer data. The positions of
the aircraft on the chart were simple latitude and longi-
tude representations of the position of N65V taken from
the ITAP data. The aircraft symbols depicted N65V's
route of flight from east to west. The government used
the time and distances between the ITAP hits to deter-
mine the approximate position of N65V at the locations
where N65V's low altitude prohibited a radar hit. The
court dismissed the ITAP data charted on Exhibit 23 as
merely the "Government's opinion" as to the location of
N65V at the time of logged radio communications.' 6' No
witness refuted the chart. The district court's rejection of
the radar/computer data and the information extrapo-
lated from it lacked rational explanation.
The failure of the district court to accept the validity of
the radar data demonstrated the court's dedication to a
certain social goal. The failure of both courts to hold the
pilot accountable for his errors contradicted aviation jus-
tice. The courts erred in ignoring the pilot error which
misled the LC into believing that N65V was not in the
general vicinity of the tower. The courts failed to recog-
nize the fact that approaches to an airport "conducted
under instrument flight rules are required to be in accord-
ance with the standard instrument approach procedure
set forth in Part 97 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations."'16 2
Outstanding case law from the Fifth Circuit and other
lI It at 53.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 919 (C.D.
Cal.), aj'd, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), aftd. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Four months after
Daley, a different panel of the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged requisite pilot skill
in the operation of an aircraft (for instrument approaches or otherwise as a condi-
tion of certification) in Heller v. United States, 803 F.2d 1558 (11 th Cir. 1986). In
Heller a FTCA lawsuit alleged the negligent decertification of a pilot by the FAA.
"In discharging this duty, the Administrator requires a pilot to obtain a medical
certificate as a condition to the issuance of an airman's certificate which also certi-
fies the pilot's aviation skills. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (1986)." Id at 1560. It
would almost appear that these panels of the Eleventh Circuit were serving cross
purposes.
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circuits illustrates the absurdity of the Daley decision. For
example, in Redhead v. United States163 the Third Circuit
decribed the respective duties of pilots and controllers as
concurrent but independent duties and stated that "deci-
sions that depend on conditions known in detail only by
the pilot must be made by him."' 64 The Ninth Circuit ob-
served in Hamilton v. United States 165 that "the duties of the
controllers, when they exist at all, are purely secon-
dary."'1 66  In United States v. Miller167 the Ninth Circuit
noted that the main function of controllers has been ruled
to merely assist the pilot in the performance of duties im-
posed on the pilot.1 68 The overall language of the Elev-
enth Circuit in Daley16 9 rejected not only the legislative
and administrative schemes which created the regulatory
pilot-in-command concept,1 70 but also cases from several
circuits reciting the pilot-in-command concept.17' The pi-
lot bears the primary responsibility for the operation of
the aircraft whether or not the pilot knows he is dealing
with an emergency or the controller thinks the pilot is
dealing with an emergency. 72
-eS 686 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
- Id, at 183.
343 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal.1971), aft'd, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974).
"' Id at 432.
167 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
- Id at 710-11.
- In footnote 11 of the Daley decision, the Eleventh Circuit cited United States
v. Schutetus, 277 F.2d 322, 328 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960). The
court noted that "our predecessor court indicated that air traffic controllers may
even owe a greater duty than pilots in situations, such as here, where a pilot is
operating under IFR conditions." Daley, 792 F.2d at 105 n.1 1. That dictum failed
to comprehend the difference between IFR flight in those cases where the pilot is
not executing a standard procedure and is relying on the controller to provide
vectors for his route of flight or altitude, from situations like that in Daley. In Daley
the existence of IFR conditions should have no bearing on the pilot's customary
duty and the controller's reliance on the pilot performing exactly as he was
trained, tested and certified to do.
170 If anything, in an emergency the pilot is afforded greater authority in exer-
cising his discretionary powers. See Chapman v. United States, 194 F.2d 974 (5th
Cir. 1952).
17 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1986) (pilot-in-command concept). The Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision ignored patent pilot negligence and the pilot's failure to comply
with 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1986).
72 The duty of a controller has been described as one of ordinary care or due
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"[T]he duties of a pilot do not cease merely because
clearance from the tower has been received.11 78 Mellish
had to have been negligent when he collided with the
tower after he failed to conduct the missed approach pro-
cedure.7 4 As the holder of a multi-engine certificate,
Mellish had been tested, certified, and required to per-
form such a missed approach procedure even after the
loss of one engine. In concluding that Mellish could not
execute an inital approach or a missed approach, or main-
tain control after loss of one engine, the Eleventh Circuit
substituted its inexpert judgment for the judgment of the
regulatory agency which determined the minimum per-
formance criteria. The FAA established regulatory re-
quirements with which the pilot must comply in executing
an approach or missed approach. The Eleventh Circuit
merely substituted its own personal judgment as to con-
troller/pilot responsibilities for the FAA's system upon
which those knowledgeable in aviation rely.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's find-
ing that, "given the emergency situation confronting Mel-
lish," pilot error did not proximately cause the crash.' 7 5
The circuit court reasoned illogically that had the control-
ler warned the pilot about the towers 7 6 the pilot could
have safely landed N65V as required by regulation. The
district court erred in finding no pilot negligence, not
diligence even in an emergency. Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 486
(W.D. Wash. 1975), cting Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.
1972). The respective duties of pilot and controller might arguably be exchanged
only when the pilot is relying on air traffic control to provide a service that the
pilot cannot perform or that he is not expected to perform under the regulatory
scheme. A singular example occurs when, in IFR weather conditions, a controller
provides radar vectors to separate two aircraft because they cannot physically see
each other. The controller does not intend for the pilots to follow the regulatory
approach procedures while he is providing sequencing information.
175 Todd v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1975), afd, 553
F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1977).
.7. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.116(e)(1986).
175 Daley, 792 F.2d at 1087 n.14.
176 Such a warning would seemingly have been a useless act since, as the district
court observed, it "probably is correct" that the pilot Mellish "should have seen
the depiction of the antenna towers." Daley, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 48.
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only because the pilot should have been aware of the tow-
ers, but also because he misrepresented his position to
controllers.177 Under the facts, the Eleventh Circuit erred
in affirming the district court's ruling as to no pilot negli-
gence because that ruling is not supportable. 178 Daley can-
not be reconciled with cases like Ross v. United States, 179 in
which the Fifth Circuit recognized that the pilot "was
aware of the necessity for maintaining prescribed ap-
proach altitudes" or executing regulatory approach pro-
cedures (or direction of flight and missed approach
procedures). 180
As to the findings of fact and conclusions of law relating
to air traffic control negligence, the LC did not have a suf-
ficient period of time to deal with the emergency created
in a large part by Mellish. To rule that the LC could have
gotten the Center to appreciate the problem and could
have arranged to vector N65V around the towers in a six-
teen second interval is unreasonable. Furthermore, the
court erred in its opinion that the appropriate Center con-
troller could have determined the location, altitude, and
direction of flight of the radar target of N65V in even the
entire fifty-seven to sixty-two second time frame. From
the start of the emergency at 9:47:13, the ITAP data
blocks disclosed that the first radar sweep indicating the
position of N65V occurred at 9:47:20.181 The radar data
for N65V theoretically available to the Center controller
from the declaration of engine loss until the time of im-
pact would have been:
9:47:20 - (altitude missing on computer)1 82
'" See idJ at 50-54 for a discussion of pilot negligence.
078 See Daley, 792 F.2d at 1087 n.14 for the Eleventh Circuit's affirmance of the
district court ruling as to no pilot negligence.
' 640 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981).
'Id hL at 520.
The target data immediately proceeding 9:47:20 was that of 9:47:09, disclos-
ing an altitude of 500 feet.
" Because of poor reception, low altitude, or radar limitations, the altitude was
not available on the computer. These altitudes are in mean sea level, so to deter-
mine the altitude of N65V above the ground one must subtract the general airport
elevation of 152 feet.
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9:47:32 - 600 feet
9:47:44 - (missing on computer)
9:47:55 - 700 feet
9:48:07 - (missing on computer)
If the LC had immediately contacted the appropriate
Center controller after the 9:47:36 termination of the
LC's 9:47:26 transmission to Mellish to ask the controller
to look for the target of N65V executing a missed ap-
proach, the interphone call would have consumed five
seconds. All air traffic witnesses agreed that the LC re-
quest to the Center controller would have taken at least
ten seconds. That fifteen seconds meant that the search
for N65V could not begin until 9:47:51. The first N65V
target the Center controller could possibly have seen
would have been the target shown at 9:47:55 at an altitude
of 700 feet. Since spurious targets occasionally appear
from ground objects, weather phenomena, etc., a control-
ler would ordinarily have confirmed the reappearance of a
target on the two succeeding hits comprising twenty-four
additional seconds. However, assume further that the
Center controller saw the N65V target immediately and
relayed to the LC the information that the target was west
of the Gainesville Regional Airport at an altitude of 700
feet. The target's altitude of 700 feet would have placed it
above the 440-foot tower to the left of the extended cen-
terline of Runway 28, above the 233-foot tower, and
above the 295-foot tower to the right of the extended cen-
terline.183 The LC would have had no reason to believe
the N65V would continue flight almost straight ahead for
several miles, descend, and impact the tower.
The missing altitude readout on the ITAP on the last
radar return at 9:48:07 would not have indicated to either
controller that N65V did not continue the 100-foot rate of
1" Because the Center controller does not deal with ground obstructions, his
scope, set on a range of fifty miles or more, does not display such obstructions
and does not provide the kind of detail necessary for vectoring aircraft around
such obstructions. The LC might be able to roughly describe such obstructions
after reviewing the approach plate and the sectional chart (used for VFR fights).
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climb evidenced by the radar returns of 500 feet at
9:47:09, 600 feet at 9:47:32 and 700 feet at 9:47:55. The
impact of N65V with the guy wire 134 feet above the
ground18 4 proved that Mellish could not maintain the
flight altitude of N65V and that ATC's performance did
not cause the crash. That impact also contradicted Find-
ing of Fact 61 which stated that "with reasonable assist-
ance from air traffic control, the pilot could have landed
the plane. 18 - Because N65V descended from its 548-foot
altitude (700-foot MSL) at 9:47:55 to an altitude of 134
feet at no later than the 9:48:10-15 estimate of the time of
the accident made by plaintiffs' expert, the N65V had to
"land" somewhere. Since Mellish did not, or could not,
execute any missed approach procedure when he reached
an altitude of 600 feet, an accidnt was inevitable. Even if
the LC had advised Mellish of the towers ahead of him,
Mellish would have had to remain above them or thread
his way through them without radar assistance because
N65V flew too low for radar coverage.
Liability of the United States in Daley resulted from sev-
eral factors including 1) ATC expert testimony which dis-
torted ATC duties, 2) a judicial rejection of the carefully
assigned regulatory duties of the PIC, and 3) the unsup-
ported reasoning of a district court apparently struck with
an emotional commitment to placing the liability for com-
pensating the injuries on the government. The affirma-
tion of the district court decision by the Eleventh Circuit
reflected the deficiency of the appellate review process of
factually complex cases.
-s Uncontested expert accident reconstruction testimony indicated that N65V
was at a thirty degree banked angle, nose slightly low, and its speed about eighty
m.p.h. approaching its VSO (stall speed with flaps up) as ten feet of the right wing
was cut off by a thirteen degree sloping cable. It would appear that N65V never
descended below the 400-500 foot ceiling until impact. The position of the trim
indicators were in a flly left position. The helical screw holding the position of
the trim indicator would not have been affected by the impact, indicating that
Mellish attempted to offset the asymmetrical power produced by the right engine
failure and the velocity minimum control (VMC).
,ss DaLy, No. 81-1117, slip op. at 22.
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D. A capricious reversal of aviation roles by the judiciary -
Thielmann v. United States
In Theilmann v. United States186 a Bellanca aircraft flown
by Thielmann crashed into a mountain killing both
Thielmann and his passenger Blankenship.18 7 The district
court found the controllers sixty percent negligent and
the pilot forty percent negligent.1 88
Thielmann was a fifty-five year old resident of Santa
Barbara, California and a part owner of a Bellanca 17-30
single-engine aircraft bearing FAA registration number
N4907V.18 9 He held a private pilot's certificate and had
gained his instrument rating in 1976.190 Since then, he
had accrued about thirty-five hours of instrument time.191
On May 7, 1982, Thielmann flew N4907V (07V) from
Santa Barbara to Fresno to pick up his son-in-law Edward
Blankenship for the return to Santa Barbara.1 92 Blanken-
ship, a U.S. Marine Corps pilot, had over 144 hours of
flight time in instrument conditions.193 At 4:10 Pacific
Daylight Time Thielmann visited the FAA's Fresno Flight
Service Station for an abbreviated weather briefing.1
94
's0 No. 84-7403, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1986).
18 Id. at 13-14.
l88 Id at 16.
,69 Id at 2-3.
,9o Id at 3.
lot Id.
1- Id at 2.
1,, Id at 4. The court concluded in Finding of Fact 9 that there was "no evi-
dence that Blankenship was flying 07V during this flight." Id Pilots, however,
would generally agree that for an instrument approach a second pilot would im-
prove safety and provide assistance. Blankenship, having more than four times
Thielmann's IFR experience, would quite likely have assisted. Actually, flight by
either pilot was illegal. Thielmann's instrument currency requirement of 14
C.F.R. § 61.57(e) (1986) was not met. Id. at 3. Blankenship had never been is-
sued a civil FAA certificate. Id. at 4. He had not converted his military flying
certificate to a cvilian FAA certificate pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 61.73 (1986). This
author contends that in the absence of legal authority for either pilot to conduct
an IFR flight, there would be either 1) independent negligence by Blankenship in
permitting his carriage by a nonqualified pilot, 2) independent negligence by
Blankenship operating or failing to assist in the operation of N4907V (07V), or 3)
imputed negligence as a joint venturer.
- id at 2-3. The testimony of the retired FSS specialist, an ex-military pilot,
was to the effect that Thielmann did not appear very interested in the weather
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Thielmann asked "if weather at Santa Barbara was still as
bad" as when he had departed earlier that day.19 5 The
FSS specialist did not recommend visual flight rules
(VFR) flight because of the weather and inquired whether
Thielmann would fly IFR. 196 Thielmann replied that he
would fly VFR en route without a flight plan,1 97 and that
he would execute an instrument approach to the Santa
Barbara Airport. 98 Theilmann proceeded to fly towards
Santa Barbara, and at about 1741:38 07V impacted
mountainous terrain northwest of Santa Barbara airport
at an elevation of approximately 2700 feet above mean
sea level. 99
The court found in Finding of Fact 7 that Thielmann
had not complied with the instrument currency require-
ment of 14 C.F.R. 61.57(e) at the time of the accident. 00
The court concluded that Thielmann's noncompliance
with that FAR constituted negligence per se.20 However,
the real negligence question related to his inability to sat-
isfactorily conduct an instrument approach and execute
the missed approach procedures pursuant to the FARs.
information available and did not seem to understand that departing under IFR
conditions was much easier than landing under those conditions. The specialist
vividly remembered commenting to another specialist after Thielmann left the
FSS that the two gentlemen looked to him "like an accident looking for a place to
happen."
'" I& at 2.
1- I at 3.
'a" The FAA advises the filing of a flight plan for all flights, though it is not
required for VFR flight. Filing a flight plan indicates pilot prudence. Thielmann
should have obtained a complete weather report if for no other reason than to aid
him in selecting an alternative for the mischosen Santa Barbara Airport.
c Theilman, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 3. The court found (Finding of Fact 4)
that it was not unusual in the month of May for stratus clouds to move on shore at
Santa Barbara, necessitating an instrument approach to pass through the layer of
stratus clouds. Id
'"Id at 10.
Id 14 C.F.R. § 61.57(e)(1)(i) (1986) requires six hours of logged instrument
time under actual or simulated IFR conditions within the past six months. The
court evidenced regulatory confusion when it found that "a legal cause of this
accident was the pilot's failure to comply with the requirements for IFR flight
pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 61.57(e)(l)(i), 'recent flight experience.'" Thidmann, No.
84-7043, slip op. at 15.
201 Thielmann, No. 84-7043, slip op. at 18.
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The fact that Theilmann had not complied with the instru-
ment currency requirement did not necessarily mean that
he could not conduct the approach/missed approach pro-
cedure. Noncompliance with the currency requirement
simply set the stage for his subsequent negligence in con-
ducting an instrument approach which proximately
caused the accident.
At 1716:16 PST one of the pilots (the "pilot" of 07V) 20 2
contacted the Santa Barbara Approach (SBA) controller
and reported the position of 07V to be some twelve nauti-
cal miles (NM) north of Gaviota VORTAC (GVN).205 The
pilot reported over GVN at 1722:30 and reported just
passing GVN at 1722:57 at an altitude of 5000 feet. The
pilot was "radar identified" at 1724:09 three miles south
of GVN. The controller instructed him to "maintain VFR
conditions20 4 and to fly heading one two zero, this will be
a vector to the VOR runway two five final approach
course, VOR's in use altimeter two niner nine two. ' 20 5
The vector of 120 degrees provided the pilot with assist-
ance in making his initial approach prior to issuance of the
regulatory clearance for the purpose of intercepting the
final approach course.2 0 6  The vector of 120 degrees
202 The widow of Thielmann testified that she often monitored the radio at
home when expecting her husband's return, and prior to the accident she recalled
hearing her husband's voice making the transmission to the Local Controller at
1740:53 that "zero seven victor's in the soup." This created a very strong likeli-
hood that Blankenship was operating the controls while Thielmann operated the
radio. The court rejected this testimony, like the testimony of many other aviation
customs and practices.
203 Thielmann, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 4. The "Gaviota" VORTAC (GVN) is a
radio navigational aid located approximately fourteen nautical miles west of the
Santa Barbara Municipal Airport (SBA). Id at 4. It was being used by the pilot in
approaching from Fresno.
204 IFR separation would not be provided to a VFR aircraft.
20 The approach controller was required by a manual (71 10.65C) provision, to
remind the pilot to set his altimeter correctly to the appropriate altimeter setting
so that the pilot would not obtain erroneous altitude reports from his altimeter as
he conducted his approach. The aircraft records of 07V disclosed noncompliance
with the 14 C.F.R. § 91.170 (1986) static pressure/altimeter test and inspection
within the preceding twenty-four months period, as well as a history of #2 VOR
needle instability and the absence of any record of a check of its VOR.
The pilot was not given the ILS Runway 7 approach he requested because of
a nonfunctioning piece of equipment. Instead he was given the VOR Runway 25
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meant the pilot was to turn left to the southeast.207
At 1729:16 the controller gave a second vector of
ninety degrees to the pilot which put 07V in a due east
heading at the same altitude. 20 8 At 1734:01 the controller
instructed the pilot to turn left to a heading of thirty de-
grees and to descend to an altitude of 2300 feet. 20 9 At
1735:36 the pilot reported his altitude at 2700 feet.2 10 At
1736:43 the pilot advised that he was maintaining 2300
feet and the controller told him to turn left to a heading of
ten degrees.21 1 At 1737:02 (after the pilot had flown the
almost due north heading of ten degrees for twenty-six
seconds) the controller advised the pilot as to the pilot's
location three and one-half miles from the ZACKS inter-
section 212 and told him to turn left. to a heading of 310
degrees.213
The controller then provided the pilot his clearance,
saying "maintain two thousand three hundred until estab-
instrument approach utilized by the other pilots making uneventful approaches to
SBA. Since there is no glideslope component on a VOR approach, the instrument
provides less navigational assistance to the pilot. The VOR approach is utilized
daily throughout the United States at airports without any ILS system.
Thielmann's pilot log disclosed at least one of these approaches to SBA
previously.
7' The tops of the clouds in the SBA area were reported on the Automatic
Terminal Information Services (ATIS) as 2300 feet, which was generally con-
firmed by pilot reports. When the pilot reported at 1727:30 that he saw a United
Airlines aircraft previously reported to him by the Approach Controller, it con-
firmed that 07V was flying in visual conditions. ATIS is a recorded message on a
specific radio frequency providing weather and other airport information.
- Thieimann, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 7.
2M it
210 A During this period the pilot would have been able to see the mountains
along the coast of Santa Barbara jutting above the clouds. Because Thielmann
had been a resident of Santa Barbara for a number of years and was a pilot, the
mountains were no surprise to him and certainly served to confirm his location. In
Finding of Fact 26 the court acknowledged the pilot's familiarity with the topogra-
phy. I at 8. The pilot's instrument approach plate depicted mountains to the
north. L
211 id at 7.
212 The approach plate displayed the ZACKS Intersection just over six miles
from Runway 25. Since 07V had not yet intercepted the GVN ninety-nine degree
radial, it was necessarily south of the 279 degree final approach course. ZACKS
intersection is the final approach fix for the VOR Runway 25. Id at 7.
213 Id
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lished on the final approach course cleared VOR runway
two five approach. ' 21 4 The pilot acknowledged receipt of
that regulatory clearance to conduct his own standard in-
strument approach when he intercepted the ninety-nine
degree GVN radial and established himself on the final
approach course of 279 degrees westbound to Runway
25.2 15 Thus, the vectors of 07V ended, and the pilot was
unquestionably required to maintain an altitude of 2300
feet until he intercepted the 279 degree final approach
and turned inbound to the airport.21 8 All ATC experts
agreed that this clearance was "complete in itself, with no
need for vectors." In Finding of Fact 13 the court errone-
ously concluded that "[f]rom and after this point in time,
07V was under the directional control of the ATG person-
nel in the Santa Barbara control tower" (emphasis ad-
ded). 7 The plaintiffs' ATC expert convinced the court
of that position although it contradicts customary ATC
procedures. Quite simply put, the aviation community un-
derstands that it is the pilot's regulatory responsibility to
execute a clearance to approach for landing. The ATG
assists the pilot only if the pilot requests it or if the con-
troller thinks the pilot needs assistance.
The only exhibit providing earlier flight path data as to
07V was the radar data from the Los Angeles Center's In-
214 IM at 7-8. Compliance with ATC clearance is required by 14 C.F.R. § 91.75
(1986). An ATC clearance is described in the FAA Pilot/Controller Glossary as
"An authorization by air traffic control, for the purpose of preventing collision
between known aircraft, for an aircraft to proceed under specified traffic condi.
tions within controlled airspace (See ATC Instructions)."
215 Id at 8.
216 The court acknowledged the pilot's duty to conduct a standard approach in
Finding of Fact 25: "The VOR 25 clearance given to the pilot at 1737:02 was to
conduct a standard instrument approach as depicted on an instrument approach
plate, which plate is required pursuant to 14 C.F.R., Parts 116(a) and 97 to be in
the possession of and utilized by all pilots making this approach. The evidence
shows that the pilot was in the possession of the plate during this'flight." Id at 8.
Apparently the court either failed to comprehend the purpose of that regulation
or arbitrarily rejected the negligenceperse rulings of the Ninth Circuit because the
rulings did not fit into the court's scheme of things.
217 Id at 5.
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terim Track Analysis Program (ITAP). 18 The ITAP radar
data disclosed partial information based on a limited
number of radar target "hits" of 07V from a 1735:02 hit
4.36 miles south of the GNV ninety-nine degree radial to
the last hit at 1737:48, just south ofthe GVN ninety-nine
degree radial.219 Plaintiffs' ATC expert displayed the lati-
tude and longitude of the radar hits on a chart indicating
07V's flight path with a northeasterly heading, moving left
to a more northerly heading, and then veering to the right
on a heading of sixteen degrees straight to the accident
site. The radar data disclosed an average ground speed of
87.4 knots for the 2.89 NM between the radar hits of
1735:02 and 1737:01, and 112.5 knots for the 1.47 NM
between the radar hits of 1737:01 and 1737:48. No radar
hit occurred after the last hit at 1737:48 just south of the
GVN ninety-nine degree radial to provide conclusive evi-
dence of 07V turning left inbound to a heading of 289
degrees (the reciprocal of the GVN ninety-nine degree ra-
dial on the VOR final approach course).
Subsequent to the accident, the approach controller
wrote a customary post-accident statement which the
court did not accept. The approach controller stated that
after the 1737:02 clearance acknowledgement by 07V, he
observed 07V in a left turn tracking inbound to the
ZACKS Intersection "slightly right of course.1220  At
2-s The Center terminated its handling of 07V when it handed off07V to Santa
Barbara Approach Control.
219 The last radar hit was some forty seconds after the approach controller's
transmission directing the pilot to establish himself on the final approach course
and clearing him for the VOR approach.
-0 The approach controller testified that 07V was flying slightly north and gen-
erally parallel with the 289 degree final approach course as the target converged.
Aircraft are not expected to be precisely on the 289 degree course. The court's
fixation on government liability is seen in its rejection of the evidence supporting
the approach controller's testimony. At 1745:49 the controller called the Flight
Service Station (FSS) and noted that 07V had dropped off the scope a little east of
the airport. At 1746:34 he requested the FSS to check the field at Santa Ynez to
see if 07V had landed there, because he thought 07V had continued flight to the
west. At 1747:31 he called the Center to report that 07V had "dropped off the
radar scope" while making the approach. At 1748:55 he again called the Center
to report that 07V had "dropped offthe radar scope just about 5 miles east of the
85319871
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1740:08 he told 07V to contact the LC on a different fre-











between 07V and the LG:
Bellanca 4907V say your position now
Santa Barbara Tower Bellanca 4907
Victor
Bellanca 4907 Victor say your position
ah 07 Victor is ah lost 221
07 Victor roger understand you don't
have the airport in sight
07 Victor's in the soup
roger, continue inbound and report
having the airport in sight are you still
ah tracking inbound on the Gaviota
099 radial?
ah 07 Victor is not on the 99 as yet
roger contact departure control now
125.4
The next broken transmission from 07V came at
1741:24 on the approach/departure frequency to the
same approach controller (AC) who had handled 07V pre-
viously. 222 That broken transmission was "(unintelligible)
seven." 223 The AC testified that because of his uncer-
tainty as to what the pilot was doing, he told the LC to tell
the pilot to execute the standard missed approach proce-
dure. 4 The LC advised 07V at 1741:30 to "execute the
airport, that is not unusual." (Radar coverage limitations on low flying aircraft
would explain this.)
I At that point, a controller would naturally assume that the pilot would know
not only his position, but also how to conduct the standard instrument approach
described by the court in Finding of Fact 25. See Thielmann, No. 84-7403, slip op.
at 8. The LC testified that he never saw the radar target of 07V. The court
assumed that the LC should have understood the word "lost" to be taken in the
pejorative sense, despite the fact that the pilot may not have descended
sufficiently through the cloud layer to have the airport in sight. The pilot affirmed
that he was still in the cloud layer when he transmitted at 1740:53 that he was "in
the soup" (IFR weather). Id. at 9.
-'The LC had already told 07V at 1741:09 to contact the AC, and the broken
transmission at 1741:24 to the AC was probably from 07V. Therefore, 07V would








missed approach," but, assuming the pilot had changed to
the departure frequency as instructed at 1741:09, 07V
would not have received that transmission.225
At 1741:37 07V made its last broken transmission say-
ing "(unintelligible) Bellanca nine. ' 226 All witnesses as-
sumed the pilot of the aircraft made the transmission.
The plaintiffs' experts led the court to conclude in Find-
ing of Fact 34 that the accident occurred at or about the
moment of the second broken transmission at 1741:38.2
Although no real evidence supported that conclusion, the
entire decision hinged oni a "projected" flight path termi-
nating with the collision at that instant.
The United States argued that the pilot recognized his
problem (and the start of an "emergency") when he said
he was "lost" at 1740:44 and, though disoriented to some
degree, began to consider his options. The United States
further contended that the pilot, whether disoriented or
otherwise, flew the inbound course toward the airport and
for unknown reasons turned right in executing the missed
approach rather than turning left.2 The court avoided
this contention by accepting the testimony of plaintiffs'
experts that, based on time and airspeed, 07V could not
have flown an inbound course to within five miles of the
airport, turned outbound to the northeast, and collided
with the mountain at 1741:38. The experts did not testify,
though, as to what the pilot's angle of bank and airspeed
would have been in conducting the missed approach from
the final approach course. More importantly, plaintiffs
stated in their Contentions of Fact and Law that "if in fact,
course, if one were to accept the court's finding that 07V was never inbound on
the ninety-nine degree GVN radial, the coordination between AC and LC would
necessarily be academic.
, The fact that the pilot never queried the controllers as to his position may
well have indicated his understanding that radar contact with the LC or the AC
was unavailable after he continued his descent on the final approach course.
See Thielmann, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 9.
2Id. at 10.
22 Again, the court acknowledged in Finding of Fact 27 the standard missed
approach procedure on the approach plate, but did not relate it to anything. See
id at 8.
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07V was observed on radar by [the AC] at 1740:36 at the
point testified to by [him] and if 07V maintained the same
constant speed 229 from the point where [the AC] observed
it to the crash site 07V could not have arrived at the crash
site until 1746:02." The fly in the ointment of that logic is
that the crash actually occurred at closer to either the
1744 time found on a stopped watch in the cockpit or the
1745 time found in the NTSB report (assumedly taken
from the stopped aircraft clock).
E. The Argument Against the Factual Errors and Judicial
Misunderstanding Regarding the PIC Concept in
Thielmann v. United States
1. A Miscomprehension of Primary Responsibility
In Theilmann the district court provided a classic exam-
ple of a court confused not only as to the principal cause
of an aviation accident, but also as to the regulatory re-
quirements supporting the ATC system of the United
States. Even if controller negligence contributed to the
accident, the district court should not have placed a
greater percentage of negligence on the controllers (sixty
percent) than on the pilot-in-command (forty percent).230
Despite its recital in Conclusion of Law 2 that violations
of the FARs are "considered negligence as a matter of
law," the court undermined the significance of the FARs
when it incorrectly cited 14 C.F.R., Parts 116(a) in Find-
ing of Fact 25.231 The correct cite is 14 C.F.R. § 91.116(a)
(1986). In Finding of Fact 25 the court recognized that 14
C.F.R., Parts 116(a) and 97 required an instrument ap-
-D There was no testimony to the effect that a pilot executing a missed approach
would maintain the same airspeed as a pilot on the descent to land on the final
approach course. Because the Thielmann pilot was not simply executing a stan-
dard missed approach, but was so disoriented that he made a wrong turn, the
airspeed and the angle of bank were impossible to estimate.
2,0 Theilmann, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 16. The court's somewhat slapdash ap-
proach to the decision is reflected in Conclusion of Law 6, in which the court
erred in awarding damages to the Thielmann heirs without excluding the portion
representing his forty percent negligence. See id. at 18.
-1 See id. at 8.
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proach plate.25 2 However, the court failed to address the
issue of pilot noncompliance with such regulatory ap-
proach procedures, which resulted in an erroneous con-
clusion of law regarding the degree of pilot negligence.
The court stated in Finding of Fact 34 that "07V did not
intercept nor did he ever become established on the VOR
runway two five final approach course. '2 3 3 However, 07V
must have crossed the 289 degree final approach course in its
northerly heading. The legal conclusion must be reached
that the pilot violated 14 C.F.R. § 91.116(a) and Part 97,
and that such violations were the primary proximate cause
of the accident. The pilot also failed to comply with the
FAR instrument currency requirement. 234 This noncom-
pliance set the stage for his failure to comply with the reg-
ulatory approach and missed approach requirements.
This failure to comply with procedures caused the aircraft
to hit the mountain.23 5
2. A Factious Accident Time
Before discussing the flight path of 07V, it should ini-
tially be noted that the portion of Finding of Fact 17 stat-
ing that the pilot" had no means of directional ravigation
available to him other than the vectors assigned by the
ATC personnel" 236 was clearly wrong. The record was re-
plete with testimony concerning the navigational radios
#1 and #2 and their settings after the accident. Appar-
ently the pilot(s) used the #2 radio for primary course
guidance and the #1 radio for cross-bearing informa-
tion.28 7 Unfortunately, the judge failed to understand that
232 IdL
"5 Id at 10.
2 &I at 3.
Despite the judge's avoidance of the regulatory approach procedures re-
quired of the pilot, judicial notice of those regulations and the fact that they re-
quire mandatory pilot compliance can be found in Locdheed Air Terminal, 318 F.
Supp. at 918.
230 Thielmann, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 6.
23 The # 1 navigational radio was set to the SBM ILS (110.3), but the Omni-
bearing selector was set to 148 degrees, rather than seventy-three degrees; the
#2 radio was set to the GVN VOR (116.5) but the Omni-bearing selector was set
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the pilot(s) were trained, tested and required to provide
some "directional navigation" in determining their head-
ing by using not only a compass but also a cross-reference
of their navigational radios. 23 8 The fact that the pilot(s)
received navigational heading (vectors) earlier was irrele-
vant. The instrument-rated pilot had a regulatory respon-
sibility to provide his own directional navigation in
intercepting the localizer course after the controller gave
the clearance.
More importantly, the court erred in omitting any find-
ings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the pi-
lot's regulatory duty after the controller provided the
clearance. In Finding of Fact 17 the judge acknowledged
the controller's transmission to 07V at 1724:09 as a "vec-
tor to the VOR runway two five final approach course. 2 9
However, the judge did not make a finding of fact regard-
ing the pilot's acknowledgement of that transmission at
1724:27, nor did she draw a legal conclusion as to the pi-
lot's regulatory requirement to comply with the clearance
by intercepting the final approach course. For the court
to conclude, as it did on Finding of Fact 34, that 07V did
not intercept nor become established on the VOR 25 ap-
proach course, the court would have to have found as a
matter of fact that the pilot did not execute the clearance
provided, and, as a conclusion of law, that the pilot vio-
lated the FARs by failing to comply with the clearance
provided. 240  The court abrogated its responsibilities in
failing to make such findings or conclusions and failed to
to 279 degrees. However, it doesn't matter which navigational radio was set on
which VOR.
231 The court patently erred in Finding of Fact 17 when it found that the pilot
"had no means of directional navigation." See Thielmann, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 6
for Finding of Fact 17. This finding clearly illustrated the court's misunderstand-
ing as to how pilots use their instruments for IFR flight. The vectors provided by
ATC merely assisted the pilot in conducting an expedited flight to the final ap-
proach course. The absurdity of the court's conclusion is best represented by the
theoretical question as to what the pilot would do if, as occasionally happens, he
lost radio communications because of equipment malfunction.
239 Id
240 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.75 (1986).
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provide a substantial record or justification for its deter-
mination of the respective degrees of negligence under
the comparative negligence law of California.
The court found in Finding of Fact 34 that 07V im-
pacted with the mountainous terrain at approximately
1741:38,241 the theoretical time posited by plaintiffs' ex-
perts. The court based this time on the last interrupted
radio transmission from 07V at 1741:37.242 Finding of
Fact 34 had no real factual support and was in fact contra-
dicted by the only real evidence as to the time of the acci-
dent. That evidence included the time of 1745 taken from
the NTSB report and the time of 5:44 (1744) found on a
Lord Elgin watch located amongst the instrument panel
debris on the left side of the cockpit.
The last recorded radar target data of 07V taken from the
Los Angeles Center computer disclosed nine radar re-
turns from 07V for the time period of 1735:02 to
1737:48. The last of these radar returns from 07V oc-
curred at 1737:48 which obviously left three minutes and
fifty seconds of flight time until plaintiffs' proposed im-
pact time. Regardless of any average speed computed by
plaintiffs' expert, 07V could not have crashed at the im-
pact site if the time of the accident was later than plain-
tiffs' theorized time of approximately 1741:38., Plaintiffs'
pilot expert testified that an accident time of 1744 or 1745
would place the site of the accident so far north of where
the accident actually occurred that the site would be "off
the map, and their theory as to the accident time would go
out the window." The court avoided the true inbound
flight path of 07V as witnessed by the AC until loss of
radar contact after which in all probability 07V made a
right turn to the point of impact at approximately 1744-
1745. This time is two minutes and twenty-two seconds
to three minutes and twenty-two seconds later than the
impact time found by the court, and is clearly based on
the only real evidence.
2 Thielmann, No. 84-7403, slip op. at 10.
242 See id at 9.
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3. Radar Vectors in the Absence of Radar Coverage
The court evidenced significant confusion about when
and where the controller lost radar contact. In Finding of
Fact 39 the court found that approach controller Harrison
failed "to advise 07V of deviation from his vectored
course and that [Harrison] had lost radar contact with
07V." 24s This finding was factually erroneous because the
controller's radar vectoring responsibility to 07V termi-
nated at 1737:02 when the controller cleared the pilot to
execute a standard VOR 25 approach. The court made
no finding as to when the controller lost radar contact.
No real facts disputed the testimony of A.C. Harrison that
the target of 07V had an inbound heading and that radar
contact was typically lost during the latter stage of descent
on the final approach course.
In any event, the opinion lacked findings of fact to pro-
vide support for the court's legal conclusions. The opin-
ion was factually deficient in that the court failed to find a
means by which the controllers, particularly the AG, could
have advised 07V of deviations in its flight path if radar
contact had in fact been lost. Since regulations required
the pilot to comply with the clearance for intercepting the
VOR 25 approach course, did the court erroneously con-
clude that the pilot could ignore the approach plate and
missed approach procedure detailed in Findings of Fact
26 and 27?
The court recited in Finding of Fact 37 a series of prov-
sions contained in the Air Traffic Control Handbook violated
by the controller.2,44 This recital of violations was mean-
ingless, though, because the court failed to tie the viola-
tions to specific findings of fact. By way of example, the
court referred to the Paragraph 33 "Safety Advisory. ' 245
The court mistakenly believed that 07V was a Paragraph
790 "Radar Arrival", even after the approach controller
243 Id. at 14.
244 I d at 10-11.
2-5 Id at 12.
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vectored it to its final approach course, cleared 07V for
the instrument approach pursuant to the manual, and
subsequently lost radar contact. In that situation, how
could the controller issue a safety advisory if he could no
longer see the target, particularly since 07V made a right
turn and flew north, rather than executing the left turn
missed approach required by the regulations?
As a matter of incidental interest, Conclusion of Law 2,
which stated that violations of FARs "by the pilot and
controllers" are considered negligence as a matter of law,
indicated the judge's superficial understanding of aviation
and air traffic control. Furthermore, it represented the
court's apparent inability to distinguish the difference be-
tween the secondary responsibility of air traffic control
from the primary responsibility of pilots. Controllers do
not "violate" federal air regulations2 46 because these reg-
ulations relate to the operation of aircraft and are ad-
dressed to pilots, not to air traffic controllers. While the
FARs generally direct a controller to perform his duties
pursuant to the manuals, 47 compliance with regulatory re-
quirements, such as conducting an approach to a runway
after clearance from air traffic control, is solely the duty of
the pilot.
In Thielmann the judge tragically switched the primary
responsibility for operation of the aircraft from the pilot-
in-command to the air traffic controllers even though such
a switch contradicted the regulatory scheme of the agency
most knowledgeable about the workings of the aviation
system. The court concluded that despite the pilot's fail-
ure to perform as trained, tested and certified, his degree
of negligence was less than that of the air traffic controller
246 As seen in Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 280-81 (D.C. Cir. 1977), "not
every piece of paper emanating from a department or independent agency is a
regulation." As articulated in Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 999
(D. Hawaii 1965), afd, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967), "Whatever may be the effect
of the Air Traffic Control Procedures, they are obviously not adopted in accordance with 49
U.S.C. § 1348(d) .... therefore, as this court sees it, they do not have the force and
effect of law as do the regulations."
247 See 14 C.F.R. § 65.45 (1986).
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whose secondary duty was to warn the pilot whose negli-
gence created the emergency condition. This conclusion
was pure nonsense and contrary to the entire regulatory
system of the FAA.
III. A PROPOSED NEW ROUTING FOR AVIATION TORT
LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT.
A. A Glimpse at the Claim/Litigation Picture
Currently outstanding against the FAA are over forty-
one billion dollars in some 350 grossly inflated claims
representing 105 accidents throughout the United States.
Figures available 248 as to claims and subsequent litigation
for fiscal years 1981-1985 indicated the filing of 1690
claims for a yearly average of 338 new claims. The total
dollar amount demanded in lawsuits during the five year
period exceeded forty-three billion dollars,249 with over
twenty-one billion dollars being claimed in 1984 alone.
During the five year period nearly 1000 complaints were
filed against the United States in federal district courts.
These cases represented 179 different aircraft accidents
with a combined total exceeding twenty-five billion
dollars.
No attempt has been made to correlate the amounts of
settlements or judgments to the calendar year of the acci-
dents involved. In 1985 the FAA paid a total of
$6,691,000 to settle $105 million in claims, while the
United States paid over thirty-three million dollars to set-
tle pending litigation or to satisfy adverse judgments. In
the absence of any settlements in 1985 relating to a major
248 The limited clerical staff and absence of computer data make it difficult to
provide accurate figures. In any event, such information would have no direct
bearing on the value of settlements or judgments.
249 The most sizeable litigation involved the Dallas-Ft. Worth accident of the
Delta Airlines L-1011 in August of 1985. Delta's demand for the value of their
aircraft, as well as personal injury and death claims, exceeded $100 million.
Other major cases include the Wings West midair collision at San Luis Obispo,
California and the Aeromexico midair collision near Los Angeles on August 31,
1986.
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aviation disaster, it appears fair to say that claim settle-
ment payments by the FAA or litigation settle-
ment/judgment satisfaction by the United States
exceeding $100 million in a calendar year involving a ma-
jor accident is not unrealistic. With the marked growth in
the carriage of passengers by U.S. carriers,250 the dollar
value of aviation claims will undoubtedly continue to
increase.
After aviation tragedies involving U.S. carriers resulted
in 526 deaths in 1985, 1986 was the safest year since 1980
for major U.S. airlines.25' Commuter airlines had the low-
est accident rate and lowest number of deaths in ten
years, with only two accidents resulting in four fatali-
ties.252 In 1986 Part 135 air taxi accidents caused the
deaths of sixty-four people, and 466 general aviation acci-
dents caused 958 fatalities. 253 Though the typical level of
general aviation accidents has been approximately 2500
accidents annually, the twenty-six percent decline in the
sale of general aviation aircraft from 1985 to 1986 might
signal a decline in future general aviation activity and
accidents.254
250 See MajorAirnes Log Safe Year, Washington Post,Jan. 13, 1987, at A10, col. 1.
The Air Transport Association estimated that 416 million passengers flew last
year, compared with 380 million in 1985 and 345 million in 1984. Id
253 1 This does not consider the Aeromexico midair collision over Cerritos,
California which may involve claims against the United States with respect to
sixty-seven passenger deaths, the deaths of fifteen individuals on the ground, and
considerable property damage. Id.
2.52 Id.
2- idL "Part 135" refers to Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations enti-
tled "Air Taxi Operations and Commercial Operators of Small Aircraft."
25- The most significant factors expressed by the General Aviation Manufac-
turer's Association for depressing sales are the rapidly rising costs of product lia-
bility insurance and foreign competition. The reduced sales may only signal a
greater effort in the rebuilding of older aircraft, particularly in light of the relative
low cost of fuel. The annual data taken from the FAA's "General Aviation Activity
Avionics Survey" of recent years disdosed a probable leveling off in the number
of active aircraft and hours flown annually based on a belief that the numbers
forecasted for 1986 and 1987 are probably too high:
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B. Determining Liability on the Merits
The judicially created inroads into the PIC concept in
recent years will probably continue to expand unless Con-
gress amends the FTCA. When Congress enacted the
FTCA in 1946, it did not wish to permit a jury to deter-
mine the liability of the United States. 255 Forty years
later, Congress must seriously consider amendment to the
FTCA to stem a different problem. A judicial escape from
a growing case load, coupled with either an unwillingness
or an inability to comprehend the regulatory and proce-
dural system established by the FAA, has prompted a
growing number of courts to fall back on some false sense
of generosity as a basis for U.S. liability in aviation acci-
dent litigation. The courts may simply not have the time
to understand the aviation system and the duties and re-
sponsibilities of the pilots and controllers. What is the
alternative?
After more than a decade of experience in the Chief
Counsel's office of the FAA, the writer's position is that
attorneys in the Litigation Division of the FAA are far bet-
ter suited to objectively pass judgment on the perform-
ance of FAA employees than all but a handful of judges.
Time has aptly demonstrated the objectivity of the
claims/litigation process of this office, as well as its re-
moval from administrative pressures and most bureau-
cratic delays.256 The writer knows of no situation in which
an FAA official has attempted to influence an attorney's
decision in the settlement of a claim or in the strategy of




1986 estimated 228,000 forecasted 87,000,000
1987 estimated 228,000 forecasted 38,000,000
(in all probablity will not exceed 210,000)
233 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) currently provides that "any action against the
United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the Court without ajury." Id
20 An enlarged staff of competent clerical personnel would be a condition pre-
cedent to the FAA's assignment of the additional workload.
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inhibit this office's criticism of an FAA employee's per-
formance, particularly to the extent that performance af-
fected the course of claims/litigation. Though no system
is perfect, an objective appraisal of FAA employee per-
formance by this office generally surpasses the theoreti-
cally detached appraisal of most federal district courts by
such a significant degree that there can be no real
comparison.
Like the salaries of federal judges, the salaries of FAA
attorneys are not conditioned upon the outcome of litiga-
tion. Aviation claims would be satisfied from the general
funds of the United States rather than from the FAA's ap-
propriated funds in order to remove the Chief Counsel's
office from undue influence. A federal district court judge,
burdened with constitutional issues and prioritized crimi-
nal cases, cannot be expected to absorb the technical
complexities of pilot and air traffic control procedures in a
relatively short period of time and dispassionately render
a truly objective judgment. Docket delay has already
prompted the consideration of various methods of expe-
diting the resolution of litigation. The limited use of
magistrates in the arbitration of aviation accident cases
has proven ineffective because of their inability to com-
prehend the complexities of the aviation system and tort
law in the time restrictions imposed upon them.25
Though the FTCA could be amended in a variety of
ways, the writer believes that the most objective means of
determining the liability of the United States and fairly as-
sessing damages would be something like an "Aviation
Tort Liability Board" within the Litigation Division of the
Chief Counsel's Office of the FAA. This Board would pro-
vide the unappealable review25 1 of the determination of
2-7 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) for a discussion of arbitration in United States
Commerce. It appears that any alternative means of dispute would suffer from
the same problems experienced with the use of U.S. Magistrates. Such alternatives
include voluntary arbitration, mandatory arbitration, mediation, negotiated settle-
ments, mini-trials, facilitation, convening, etc.
2- The review would be unappealable unless new facts having material bearing
on the cause of the accident were offered during some fixed period of time.
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liability. Generally, documented claims would be submit-
ted 259 by a claimant or claimant's attorney with relevant
documentary evidence including a memorandum/brieF60
arguing the basis for liability and analyzing the economic
damages. The claimant would have some opportunity to
obtain necessary documents from the FAA in preparation
of the claim 26' and to depose a restricted number of mate-
rial FAA employees.
While trying to avoid the inevitable criticism of being
too doctrinaire in this recommendation, suffice to say that
the proposal is a concept which any impartial taxpayer
would find to be:
1. a more objective means of determining the liability
and damages of the United States;
2. a more expeditious and less expensive means for
the assertion of aviation claims/litigation against the
United States;
3. a means of eliminating litigation which has no gen-
uine basis in fact or law and ties up courts and resources
with some hope of sufficiently confusing the court;
4. a means of providing greater protection for the
U.S. Treasury.
CONCLUSION
The FTCA's intent to objectively resolve negligence
claims has in recent years proven increasingly ineffective
in the field of aviation tort law. The growth of aviation,
coupled with its increased technical complexity, has un-
259 Procedures would be established by regulation, similar to the Department of
Justice Procedures for the filing of claims under the FTCA found in 28 C.F.R.
§ § 14.1-14.11 (1986).
2o Such brief would be limited to perhaps twenty-five pages.
26, Without arbitrarily deciding which documents are truly "necessary," some
control of discovery would have to be established. In the writer's experience, pro-
duction of documents under the FRCP has been abused and an FAA manual or
other publication has too often provided nothing more than an argument for
technical noncompliance which was not really a proximate cause of the accident.
Such technical noncompliance may have create some misunderstanding in the
court's mind, but, in the vast majority of cases, it should have no real bearing on
the cause of the accident.
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fairly burdened federal district courts with the resolution
of issues requiring the luxury of time for comprehension
which, unfortunately, few courts can provide. Cases recit-
ing FAA regulations or procedures by district courts and
circuit courts of appeals are increasingly ignored by other
courts and panels within that circuit or other circuits, or
are "distinguished" by facts which are indistinguishable to
anyone who understands aviation and the ATC system.
The arbitrary rejection of FARs in tort litigation by a
growing number of courts and the acceptance of testi-
mony by ATC experts which has no basis in the regulatory
responsibilities and training of pilots and controllers is
becoming so debilitating to the defense of an increasing
number of lawsuits by the United States under the FTCA
that amendment of the FTCA is mandated.
The pressures on the judicial system caused by the
overall increase in litigation over the years have too often
created a judicial laxity in an appraisal of the ATC system
and the responsibilities understood by its users. The re-
sult has been a growing judicial melange of factual and
legal inconsistencies in direct conflict with the aviation
system created and enforced by the FAA. This develop-
ment justifies amendment of the FTCA to provide for the
review of facts by the FAA in nonmilitary aviation acci-
dents for the purpose of determining liability and
damages.
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